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RECENT DECISIONS
ARBITRATION-WHEN IS A DISPUTE ARBITRABLE-JURISDICTION OF COURT AND
ARBITRAToR.-Petitioner, a member of a medical co-partnership was discharged for
allegedly committing acts adversely affecting that organization, pursuant to an
agreement which enumerated the procedure for such expulsion. The expulsion fol.
lowed the procedure outlined in the agreement. Nevertheless, petitioner brought a
proceeding to compel arbitration on the ground that the partnership had adduced
no evidence in support of the charges. The contract contained the following arbitration provision: "Should any controversy arise with respect to the interpretation
of any of the terms of this agreement or with respect to the rights of any partner
pursuant to this agreement, such controversy shall be submitted to arbitration." The
Supreme Court, Special Term, granted an order directing arbitration. The Appellate Division, one justice dissenting, affirmed. On appeal, held, order dismissed;
no arbitrable dispute was presented since the petitioner failed to show prima facie
that there were no grounds for his expulsion. Essenson v. Upper Queens Medical
Group, 307 N.Y. 68, 120 N.E. 2d 209 (1954).
By statute parties to a contract have the right to incorporate arbitration clauses
in their agreements whereby disputes arising under the contract may be disposed of
without recourse to the courts.' Among the reasons advanced for the use of arbitration are speed, economy, privacy and the maintenance of good will and the preservation of business friendship. 2 The legislatures have shown a tendency to expand
the field of arbitrable disputes,3 and the courts in the past have upheld legislative
4
enactments against the contention that they oust the courts of jurisdiction.
A most significant fact in arbitrations is that the arbitrators are frequently laymen, unlearned in the law. Conjoined with this fact is the well established principle
that the arbitrator, even where he may be a lawyer, need not follow the law or ju1. At common law agreements to arbitrate future disputes were unenforceable. Hurst
v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377 (1868); Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491 (1858); Sturges,
Commercial Arbitrations and Awards § 23 (1st ed. 1930). The legislature, however, may
make such disputes arbitrable. Matter of Berkovitz et al. v. Arbib & Houlberg Inc.,
230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921). The common law recognized the right to submit
an existing controversy to- arbitration. Wood v. Tunnicliff et al., 74 N.Y. 38 (1878). An
important statutory difference between the two types of arbitration is recognized In
Matter of Select Operating Corp. v. Richard Rodgers, 183 Misc. 666, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 16
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1944).

2. Kellor, Arbitration in Action 14 (lst ed. 1941).
3. 13 Ford. L. Rev. 109-114 (1944); Kellor, Arbitration in Action 54 (1st ed. 1941).
Kellor cites two examples from New York: when the Court of Appeals in Matter of
Fletcher v. Nicholas, 237 N.Y. 440, 143 N.E. 248 (1924) held that appraisals were not
arbitrations and hence were not legally binding or enforceable, the New York Arbitration Law, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448, was amended to include appraisals, Laws of New
York 1941 c. 388; when the Court of Appeals held in Matter of Buffalo & Erie Ry. v.
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street and Rwy. Employees of America, 250 N.Y. 275, 165 N.E.
454 (1929), that the renewal of labor agreements was in effect the making of a new
contract and, therefore, not arbitrable, the same section of the New York statute was
amended to include such a subject matter, Laws of New York 1940, c. 852.
4. Matter of Berkovitz et al. v. Arbib & Houlberg Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288
(1921).

1954]

.RECENT DECISIONS

353

dicial procedure and an award may not be questioned because of mistake of law,
except where the error of law appears on the face of the award.5 Consequently, "a
party to a general arbitration sacrifices the protection of rules of law."O As a practical matter of tactics, therefore, a party to a contract containing an arbitration
clause who has a factually meritorious claim or defense but whose legal position
is weak usually prefers the arbitral tribunal to that of the courts, whereas a party
whose legal position is strong but whose claim or defense lacks equity will ordinarily seek to avoid arbitration and instead endeavor to obtain a judicial deter7
rnination.
Whether a dispute is to be determined by arbitration or in a judicial proceeding
is a question initially for the courts. 8 It may arise on a motion to compel arbi5. Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392 (1875) at page 400,
S.. awards may be set aside for palpable error of fact, like a miscalculation of
figures, or mistake of that nature. It may also be set aside for error of law, when
the question of law is stated on the face of the award, and it appears that the arbitrators meant to decide according to the law but did not." Also see Matter of Finn
v. J. J. Hart Inc., Misc. - , 133 N.Y.S. 2d 335, 336 (Sup. Ct. IN.Y. Co. 1954).
6. Handbook and Guide to Arbitration under the New York and United States Arbitration Statutes, Chamber of Commerce of New York 6 (1932). In American Almond
Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1944) Judge L.
Hand at p. 451 aptly expressed the consequences which face a party to an arbitration
contract, when he said, "Arbitration may or may not be a desirable substitute for trials
in courts; as to that the parties must decide in each instance. But when they have
adopted it, they must be content with its informalities; they may not hedge it about
with those procedural limitations which it is precisely its purpose to avoid. They must
content themselves with looser approximations to the enforcement of their rights than
those that the law accords them, when they resort to its machinery."
7. Exactly one week after the decision in the principal case was handed down by
the Court of Appeals, the same court in an opinion by Judge Van Voorhis, who also
wrote the opinion in the principal case, reversed the Appellate Division and held that
an award in an arbitration proceeding was a "judgment" obtained after a "trial"
within the meaning of an insurance policy issued to a subcontractor. The subcontractor
had agreed to indemnify a general contractor for property damage and the contract contained an arbitration provision. The insurance carrier refused to defend the claim in
an arbitration proceeding contending that it was obligated to indemnify only in the
event of a liability established by action in the courts resulting in a judgment against
the insured. The Court of Appeals held that the insurance carrier was obligated to defend
the claim in the arbitration tribunal and to pay any award. Madawick Contracting Co.
v. Travelers Ins. Co. et al., 307 N.Y. 111, 120 N.E.2d 520 (1954). The importance of
the case is evidenced by the fact that amicus curiae briefs were submitted by the American Arbitration Association and other organizations favoring arbitration. One may
speculate on the effect such a decision will have on the premium rate structure, since
now property damage claims may be determined by laymen as arbitrators without the
necessity of applying established principles of liability or damages.
8. Matter of Lehman v. Ostrovsky et al., 264 N.Y. 130, 190 N.E. 208 (1934); Matter
of Metro Plan v. Miscione, 257 App. Div. 652, 15 N.YS. 2d 35 (1st Dep't 1939) ; Matter
of Eagar Construction Corp. v. Ward Foundation Corp., 255 App. Div. 291, 7 N.Y.S.2d
450 (1st Dep't 1938).
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tration or on a motion to stay a legal action in order to permit an arbitration10 or
on a motion to stay an arbitration proceeding. 1 ' The question of the arbitrator's
jurisdiction may likewise
be determined at a later stage on a motion to confirm or
2
vacate an award.'
However the question arises, it appeared to be settled law in New York until
quite recently that the merit or lack of merit of a claim or defense was for the
arbitrators to decide, especially where the arbitration provision was one of broad
and unlimited scope, as was the one in the case under review.13 The leading New
York decision, Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co.,1 4 establishing the rule
that the merits of the claim were for the arbitrators and not for the courts, added
by way of clarification, that the arbitrators, unless restricted by the submission,
might disregard strict rules of law or evidence and decide according to their sense
of equity. Following this precedent, the Court of Appeals in Matter of Wilkens
v. Allen, Adrn'r of Lorena Allen, decd,15 decided that where a controversy was
referred to an arbitrator, his determinatiori as to the law and facts was final and
unless perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct upon his part was plainly
established, the court would not open an award. In Matter of Lipman v. Haeuser
Shellac Inc.,16 the court said that once jurisdiction had been acquired by the arbitrators the only two issues for the court's determination was whether an agreement
to arbitrate had been entered into and whether there had been a refusal to arbitrate. More recently,' 7 our highest court apparently found no error in the Supreme
Court's decision that an arbitrator could rule a contract invalid and that an opposite determination by a judicial tribunal did not preclude him from so doing.
This "hands off" attitude of the courts was expressed by one court in the state.
9. See Civ. Prac. Act § 1450.
10. See Civ. Prac. Act § 1451.
11. Application of Chemspun Yarns, Ltd., Misc. -,
132 N.Y.S. 2d 823 (Sup.
Ct. Kings Co. 1954); Application of Katz, 283 App. Div. 1092, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 627 (2d
Dep't 1954).
12. Masury v. Whiton, 111 N.Y. 679 (1888); Matter of D. Goff & Sons, Inc. v.
Rheinauer, 199 App. Div. 617, 192 N.Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dep't 1922).
13. The only apparent indication to the contrary was a dictum in Matter of Wenger
& Co. v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, 239 N.Y. 199, 202, 203, 146 N.E. 203, 204 (1924),
where the Judge Pound said, "Unquestionably a claim may be so unconscionable or a
defense so frivolous as to justify the court in refusing to order the parties to proceed
to arbitration, but where a bona fide dispute in fact arises over the performance of a
contract of purchase and sale it does not devolve upon the court to say that as matter
of law there is nothing to arbitrate."
14. 62 N.Y. 392 (1875).
15. 169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902).
16. 263 App. Div. 880, 32 N.Y.S.2d 351 (2d Dep't 1942), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 76, 43
N.E.2d 817 (1942).
17. Behrens v. Feurring et al., 182 Misc. 979, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 753 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 930, 58 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1945), appeal denied,
269 App. Div. 979, 59 N.Y.S.2d 292 (lst Dep't 1945), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 172, 71 N.E.2d
454 (1947), reargument denied, 297 N.Y. 472, 74 N.E.2d 180 (1947). See Matter of
Finn v. J. J. Hart Inc., Misc. -,
133 N.Y.S. 2d 335, 336 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1954).
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ment, "It must be assumed that the arbitrators
ill consider all the provisions
of the contract and construe them in accordance with the law." 18
Despite the foregoing, the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals in the
principal case is the culmination of a series of more recent decisions which appear
to represent a definite change in the law of New York. In Matter of International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer Inc.,10 the court said, "While the contract
provides for arbitration of disputes as to the 'manner, performance, non-performance or application of its provisions, the mere assertion by a party of a meaning
of a provision which is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the words can't
make an arbitrable issue. It is for the court to determine whether the contract
contains a provision for aribtration of the dispute tendered, and in the exercise
of that jurisdiction the court must determine whether there is such a dispute.'"
Adhering to this doctrine the Court of Appeals in Matter of Gencral Elec. Co. v.
United Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers of America,20 refused to allow arbitration
because there was no real ground of claim, regardless of the fact that the alleged dispute fell within the literal language of the arbitration agreement. The
Appellate Division in Matter of Crossett et al. v. Mt. Vernon Housing Authority21
affirmed the lower court's order directing arbitration to proceed, because there
was in fact an arbitrable dispute. It was also held in Matter of Brookside Mills
Inc., et al. v. Raybrook Textile Corp.,22 that where the facts were definite and the
legal conclusions to be drawn were established, one party had no right to demand
arbitration in order that the law might possibly be modified for his benefit, merely
because the contract contained an arbitration clause. Finally, the Court of Appeals
in the principal case unequivocally refused to submit the petitioner's claim to arbitration when he could not establish, prima facie, that he had a bona fide claim.
It must not be inferred that the decision in the principal case indicates any inclination on the part of our highest court to restrict arbitration, since the same
court, one week later, in an important opinion written by the same member of
the court who wrote the court's opinion in the principal case,- 3 gave an apparently far-reaching effect to the arbitral method of solving disputes. The decision does, however, appear to express a final, firm recognition by the court
that arbitrators cannot be presumed to "consider all the provisions of a contract
and construe them in accordance with law."2 4 Such an extension of the protection
of the law, which the decision represents, to an area in which it formerly did not
18. Matter of Tarello v. J. A. Johnson Contracting Corp., 50 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1944), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 893, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 87, appeal denied,
268 App. Div. 903, 51 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1st Dep't 1944).
19. 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 517, 74
N.E.2d 464 (1947).
20. 300 N.Y. 262, 90 N.E.2d 181 (1949).
21. 275 App. Div. 1051, 92 N.Y.S.2d 109, appeal and reargument denied, 276 App.
Div. 848, 93 N.Y.S. 2d 799 (2d Dep't 1949).
22. 276 App. Div. 357, 94 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1st Dep't 1950). In this case judge Van
Voorhis, then sitting in the Appellate Division, asserted, as he did in the principal case,
that the courts would not tolerate a frivolous claim or assume a contractual right to
have been violated on the mere assertion of a petitioner. See Matter of Webster v. Van
Allen et al., 217 App. Div. 219, 221, 216 N.Y. Supp. 552, 555 (4th Dep't 1926).
23. See note 7 supra.
24. See note 18 supra.
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exist, should be met with satisfaction by all of those who believe in the supremacy
of the law. Even the most ardent exponents of arbitration should not complain
of this new requirement that for an arbitrable dispute to exist there must be a
prima facie showing that it is real and bona fide. Such a requirement is implicit
in the very agreement to arbitrate.

BANKS AND BANKING-CONFLICT OF STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTES NECESSITATES

SUPREMACY.--New York State instituted a proceeding to enjoin the defendant, a national bank, from using the words "saving" or "savings" in relation to its banking or financial business, and from soliciting or receiving deposits as a savings bank.
Plaintiff proceeded pursuant to Section 258(1) of the New York Banking Law which
expressly prohibits the use of such terms by any institution other than those enumerated. Defendant maintained that the aforementioned section was in conflict with
Section 24 of the Federal Reserve Act which authorizes national banks to receive
and pay interest on "time and savings deposits" and thereby allegedly confers upon
national banks the implied power to advertise such fact. Reversing a judgment of
the New York Supreme Court, dismissing the complaint, the Appellate Division
granted the requested injunction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, modified and affirmed, so much of the injunction as dealt with the solicitation and receipt of deposits by the defendant as a savings bank was rejected. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, one justice dissenting, judgment reversed. The federal and state statutes were incompatible, and consequently
the policy of the State must yield. Franklin Nat. Bank of Franklin Square v. New
New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
Shortly after the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act, and even before the
statute specifically authorized receipt of "savings deposits,"' the Federal Reserve
Board considered the right of national banks, located in California, to use the word
"savings" in their advertising. The question arose under a California statute2 similar
to New York's 3 which prohibited banks, other than savings banks, from advertising
that they received "savings accounts." The Board held 4 that national banks could
use the prohibited word and that the California statute could not be enforced against
them. This 1915 ruling has not been amended or modified and remains in effect.
In 1916 Congress amended Section 24 of the Federal Reserve Act 5 to provide that
"national banks may continue hereafter as heretofore to receive time deposits and to
pay interest on the same." And, again, in 1927 the section was amended to provide, as
it does now, 6 that national banks may "continue hereafter as heretofore to receive
FEDERAL

1.

12 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1915).

2. California Banking Act § 49 (1915).
3. N.Y. Banking Law § 258 (1) (1947) which provides in part: "1. No bank, trust
company, national bank, individual, partnership, unincorporated association or corporation other than a savings bank or a savings and loan association shall make use of the
word 'saving' or 'savings' or their equivalent in its banking or financial business, or use
any advertising containing the word 'saving' or 'spvings' or their equivalent in relatlon
to its banking or financial business, nor shall any individual or corporation other than a
savings bank in any way solicit or receive deposits as a savings bank. ... i
4. 1 Fed. Res. Bull. 18 (1915).
5. 12 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1916).
6.

12 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1927), which in part states:

" ....

No such [national banking]
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time and savings deposits." The fact that no dissent was registered either by the
legislature or the judiciary is extremely significant.7 When a statute has been construed by the agency charged with its administration and Congress has not altered
that interpretation it is "entitled to great respect and should ordinarily control the
construction of the statute by the courts." s In the case at bar the administrative determination of the Federal Reserve Board has been left undisturbed by Congress
for 39 years and must be deemed approved by Congress, even if the court itself
"doubted the correctness of the ruling.' 9
It has been the general purpose of Congress to place national banks in a favorable competitive situation vis-i-vis state banks.Y° National banks were, among
other powers, successively granted the power to invest in real estate mortgages to
meet the competition of state banks," to open branches on the same basis as state
banks,'2 to pledge their assets to secure deposits of public funds so that they could
compete with state banks for such deposits, 13 to pay interest on "savings or other
deposits" at the maximum rate authorized to be paid by state banks and trust
association shall make such [real estate] loans in an aggregate sum in excess of the
amount of the capital stock of such association paid in and unimpaired plus the amount
of its unimpaired surplus fund, or in excess of 60 per centum of the amount of its time
and savings deposits, whichever is the greater. Any such association may continue hereafter as heretofore to receive time and savings deposits and to pay interest on the sam 1
but the rate of interest which such association may pay upon such time deports or upon
savings or other deposits shall not exceed the maximum rate authorized by law to be
paid upon such deposits by State banks or trust companies organized under the laws
of the State in which such association is located."
7. In Inland Waterways v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 524 (1940), the Court said: '1legality cannot attain legitimacy through practice. But when legality itself is in disputewhen Congress has spoken at least with ambiguous silence-a long continued practice pursued with the knowledge of the Comptroller of the Currency is more persuasive than considerations of abstract conflict between such a practice and purposes attributed to
Congress...."
8. Pennoyer v. AMcConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 23 (1891).
9. Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932); Zellerbach v. Helvering, 293 US.
172 (1934).
10. In Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank, 18 Wall. 409, 412 (US. 1873), the Court stated: "It
cannot be doubted, in view of the purpose of Congress in providing for the organization
of national banking associations, that it was intended to give them a firm footing in the
different States where they might be located. It was expected they would come into competition with State banks, and it was intended to give them at least equal advantages in
such competition. ... It could not have been intended, therefore, to expose them to the
hazard of unfriendly legislation by the States, or to ruinous competition with State
banks ... !
11.
12.

§ 371 (1927).
12 U.S.C.A. § 36 (1935).
12 U.S.C.A.

13. 12 US.C.A. § 90 (1930), in referring to this Act the Court in Downey v. City, 106
F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 590, stated: "The purpose of the Act of June
25, 1930, was to equalize the positions of national and state banks in competing for deposits, and is in line with a long series of acts, beginning in 1864, designed to apply the
policy of equalization."
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companies.14 National banks were exempted from filing fiduciary bonds where state
banks and other corporations are exempt by state law from doing so. 15 The Supreme
Court of the United States has also recognized that it is the express purpose of
Congress to further the interest of national banks along competitive lines to protect the ability of such banks to carry on the functions for which they were char16
tered.
The majority of the New York Court of Appeals based their decision on the
absence of any "direct" conflict between the two statutes in question, apparently
holding that some express inconsistency must exist before the unconstitutionality
of the State statute can be declared. But that is apparently not the law. It is now
established that a conflict may arise between an implied federal power and an express
7
state prohibition.'

CIVIL PRACTICE-DocTmNE Or FORUm NON CONVENIENS APPLIED TO ACTIONS
BETWEEN NON-RESmENTs.-Plaintiff, an Indiana corporation not authorized to do
business in New York, brought an action against Indiana residents based on a contract which was made, was to be performed, and allegedly was breached in Indiana.
Plaintiff's choice of the forum was aided by an attachment of certain of defendants'
property located in New York. Defendants, appearing specially, moved to vacate
the warrant of attachment, to quash the service of summons and to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court at Special
Term denied the motion. On appeal, held, two justices dissenting, order reversed.
The court should have exercised its discretion to refuse jurisdiction. Central Pub.
Co., Inc. v. Wittinan et al., 283 App. Div. 492, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 769 (1st Dep't
1954).1
The courts of New York State are empowered to entertain jurisdiction of actions
between non-residents based on contracts to be performed outside the State,2 but
in such an instance the law of the jurisdiction wherein the contract was made and
was to be performed governs. 3 Whether to accept or refuse the jurisdiction is
14. 12 U.S.CA. § 85 (1935).
15.
16.

12 U.S.C.A. § 248 (1935).
Tiffany Nat'l Bank, 18 Wall. 409, 412 (U.S. 1873).

17. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Fidelity National Bank and Trust Co. of
Kansas City v. Enright, 264 Fed. 236 (8th Cir. 1920); Springfield Inst. for Savings v.
Worcester F.S. & L. Ass'n et al., 329 Mass. 184, 107 N.E. 2d 315 (1952). The leading case
of Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220 (1903), held that a president of a national bank could
not be prosecuted under a state statute prohibiting receipt of deposits by an insolvent
bank even though there existed no federal act providing a penalty for fraudulent receipt
of deposits.
1. On respondent's motion to renew, the order
remitted to Special Term "to take proof of all
thereon whether the interests of substantial justice
tion, and enter an order thereon." - App. Div. -,
2. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft,

of reversal was stayed and the matter
relevant facts, make a determlnation
would be served by retaining jurisdic129 N.Y.S. 2d 918 (1st Dep't 1954).
277 N.Y. 474, 478, 14 N.E. 2d 798

(1938).

3. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
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a matter in the discretion of the trial court, 4 subject, however, to review by an
appellate court.

5

The doctrine of forum. non convemiens is a basis on which a court can found its
refusal of jurisdiction. 6 Some cases hold that it is the convenience of the court
to which the doctrine is directed.7 Others regard it as pertaining to the convenience
of the party defendant. 8 Still others look to the "unfairness" to the citizens of
the state exercising the jurisdiction. 9 It has been suggested as a method of relieving calendar congestion in the courts.10
The majority in the principal case alluded to the convenience of the court and
the parties and held that both would be "better served" if the action were prosecuted in Indiana." This statement indicates the application of a comparative standard as a guide to the exercise of the court's discretion. The minority stated,
"There has been no showing .. . [in this case] that the convenience of the parties

will be seriously and adversely affected by having the situs of the litigation in
New York."''2 Thus the minority looks to the convenience of the parties and would
require a hardship on defendant as a basis for the application of fonm non con-

veniens.
The assumption of jurisdiction in cases where neither plaintiff nor defendant
is a resident of the state and where the subject matter of the action is not in the
state is based on the doctrine of comity.1 3 The doctrine of forumn ion convcniens
is described as "a principle of exceptions to the doctrine of comity." 14 The courts
at one time, seeking to expand their authority, readily entertained jurisdiction of
these cases. Now, overworked, they seek ways to avoid jurisdiction. Some method
of easing calendar congestion is necessary. 5 And the temptation of a transitory
4. De Flammercourt v. Ascer, 167 Misc. 473, 3 N.Y.. 2d 461 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1938).

5. Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134, 138 (N.Y.1817); Ferguson and Nelson, 58
Hun. 604, 11 N.Y. Supp. 524 (Sup.Ct. 1890).
6. But itisreferred to as a rule of convenience and expediency rather than one of
jurisdiction. Blaustein v.Pan. Amer. Pet. & Trans. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 651,
706 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1940).
7. Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N.Y. 9, 42 N.E. 419 (1895), where the ground for refusal was the difficulty of applying a complex Kansas corporation law.
8. Zeikus v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 70 Misc. 339, 128 N.Y. Supp. 931 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Co. 1911), afl'd, 144 App. Div. 91, 128 N.Y. Supp. 933 (1st Dep't 1911), where
it was deemed a hardship on defendant to have to bring witnesses from Florida.
9. Pietraroin v. N.J. & Hudson R.R. & F. Co., 197 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. 120 (1910), where
the court looked to the effect on its citizens of increased administration expenses and
delays in their own actions.
10. Ibid.
11. Central Pub. Co. Inc. v. Wittman et al., 283 App. Div. 492, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 769 (1st
Dep't 1954).
12. Id. at 770, 283 App. Div. at 493.

13. Hoyt v.Thompson, 5 N.Y. 320, 340 (1851). Comity has been defined as "a selfimposed restraint upon an authority [e.g. to decline jurisdiction] actually possessed." Cole
v. Cunningham, 133 US. 107, 113 (1889).
14. Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col.
L. Rev. 1, 33 (1929).
15. Proskauer, A New Professional Psychology Essential for Law Reform, 14 A.B.A.J.
121 (1928).
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plaintiff to seek a metropolitan forum solely in the hope of a higher verdict is to
be discouraged. The doctrine of comity is a contributory cause of these problems.
An adaptation of that doctrine to modem problems is indicated. New rules, clear
in definition and reasonably simple of application, should be constructed. To allow
courts in their discretion to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a remedy
for 'calendar congestion is a serious error. The Court of Appeals in a recent decision suggested that the possibility of a basis for retaining jurisdiction would be
sufficient to justify denial of a motion grounded on forum non conveniens10 But
the majority of the Appellate- Division in the principal case took the opposite
approach, in effect, refusing jurisdiction unless the convenience of court and parties
would be better served here. The result of these divergencies is confusion on the
bench and at the bar. A non-resident plaintiff can never be sure that the court will
hear his cause. If forum non conveniens is truly a rule of convenience it should
17
not be applied to ignore the convenience of the plaintiff.
The importance of this case lies neither in the majority opinion, which is no
more than another guide to a trial court faced with a similar question, nor in the
minority opinion. It lies rather in the fact that it points up a very complex problem which is -deserving of a final determination by legislation or a Court of Appeals
decision.' 8

NEW YORK COURT
DIVORCE ACTION IF THE PARTIS MARRIED WITHIN THE STATE

DOMESTIC RFLATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-STATUTE GIVING

JURISDICTION

IN

UPHELD.-Plaintiff brought an action for absolute divorce alleging that the parties
were married in New York and that defendant committed adultery in France. There
was no allegation that either party was a domiciliary of New York. The summons
and complaint were served upon the defendant by publication only. Defendant
moved to set aside service on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the
subject of the action. Held, motion denied. Section 1147(2) of the New York Civil
Practice Act gives jurisdiction when the parties were married within the state. The
statute is constitutional. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S. 2d
649 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
Domicile of at least one of the parties has long been regarded as the cornerstone
of jurisdiction for divorce.1 The marital status is present in the domicile of either
16. Bata v. Bata, 304 N.Y. 51, 57, 105 N.E. 2d 623 (1952). "We realize that this
suit may, when it comes to trial, be found to involve property, transactions and laws
almost entirely foreign to New York State. Nevertheless, on the record before us, we
cannot say that there was no basis at all for retaining jurisdiction here."
17. For an interesting article with a contrary conclusion see Blair, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1929). Note also
that the federal rule and federal cases are of little assistance here. In the federal courts
the alternative to entertaining jurisdiction is to transfer the action to another forum. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1404(a). In a state court the alternative is to dismiss the action.
18. This is not the sort of question which a client would be willing to take to the
Court of Appeals without very good reason. And if such reason existed it would probably be sufficiently persuasive on the trial court to preclude the necessity of appeal. Thus
legislation is the only practical answer.
1. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams
v. North Carolina, 317
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party and this marital status is the res upon which the court acts. 2 It has been said
that a legislature does not have the power to disregard this domiciliary foundation,
since it may not act on a status beyond its boundaries.3 To say, as does the instant
decision, that the courts have considered domicile as a requisite solely for interstate recognition is to undermine the very purport of Williams v. North Carolina.4
The latter case sought to compel all states to recognize a divorce which was valid
in any one state.
Recognizing that the foundation of divorce jurisdiction rests on domicile, it has
been said by the United States Supreme Court,3 by the courts of other states,0
as well as those of New York, 7 that marriage in the state would not of itself confer
jurisdiction. The statute in question8 has, therefore, been criticized.0 The present
case looks to Becker v. Becker for support. 10 It is true that Becker v. Beccer accepted
the fact that the parties were married in New York as the sole basis of its juris-

diction to grant an annulment, but that case can be said to have been overruled by

Powell v. Powell." Schildkraut v. Schildkraut,'2 also cited as supporting authority,

U.S. 287 (1942); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.. 14 (1903); Ditson v. Ditson, 4 RI. 87
(1856).
2. Concerning the res, the subject matter the court acts upon: "In matrimonial actions the 're is the marital status of a resident of the State...." Geary v. Geary, 272
N.Y. 390, 399, 6 N.E. 2d 67, 71 (1936). See also, Senor v. Senor, 272 App. Div. 305, 70
N.Y.S.2d 909 (1st Dep't 1947).
3. Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948); People v. Dawell, 25 Mdich.
247 (1872).
4. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
5. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 103 (US. 1870).
6. Harrison v. Harrison, 20 Ala. 629 (1852); Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts. 349 (Pa.
1838); Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181 (Mass. 1833).
7. "It is now well settled the lex lod which is to govern married persons, and by which
the contract is to be annulled, is not the law of the place where the contract was made,
but where it exists for the time, where the parties have their domicil, and where they are
amenable for any violation of their duties in that relation." Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N.Y.
535, 544 (1871).
8. N.Y. Civil Practice Act, § 1147: ....
a husband or a wife may maintain an action
against the other . . . to procure a judgment divorcing the parties. .. 2 . Where the
parties were married within this state." (The idea that marriage in the state conferred
jurisdiction for divorce was first incorporated into the Revised Statutes by the Laws of
1862, and later incorporated into the Code of Civil Procedure, § 1756, now contained in
1147 C.P.A.).
9. Gray v. Gray, 143 N.Y. 354, 38 N.E. 301 (1894) said that it would presume that
the statute did not change the domicile rule. Powell v. Powell, 211 App. Div. 750, 208
N.Y. Supp. 153 (1st Dep't 1925) said that the mere fact of marriage in the state would
not confer jurisdiction on the court, the statute to the contrary notwithstanding. To the
same effect are Barber v. Barber, 89 Misc. 519, 151 N.Y. Supp. 1064 (Sup. CL 1915)
and Huneker v. Huneker, 57 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
10. 58 App. Div. 374, 69 N.Y. Supp. 75 (1st Dep't 1901).
11. 211 App. Div. 750, 208 N.Y. Supp. 153 (1st Dep't 1925). This court said that
marriage in the state had no bearing on the divorce action before them. Logically, annulment should be no different. It has therefore been said that Becker v. Becker was overruled.
12. 226 App. Div. 747, 233 N.Y. Supp. 585 (2d Dep't 1929).
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is distinguishable, for there the wife remained in the place of marriage, and the court
did not invoke the use of the statute.
What would appear to be the best New York authority for the belief that domicile is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction is Gould v. Gould.'3 But this decision was
clearly based on the "matrimonial domicile" doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock,14 and
can be said to have been overruled, as was Haddock, by Williams v. North Carolina.' 5 Unfortunately, the matrimonial domicile doctrine still makes an occasional
16
appearance.
It is true that Williams v. North Carolina17 actually held no more than that domicile of one of the parties is sufficient for divorce jurisdiction. But it is also true
that the Williams case sought to substitute domicile of one of the parties for the old
concept of matrimonial domicile. 18 The implication was strong that domicile of one
of the parties henceforth would be necessary to give jurisdiction for divorce. And this
implication was recognized in subsequent cases. 19
The decision in the instant case would brush aside the implication and would
recognize a second basis for divorce jurisdiction-marriage within the state. It
argues that the second basis is a valid one because the statute authorizes it and
the statute's longevity20 favors its constitutionality. This argument presupposes frequent use of the statute by the courts. But prior to the instant case New York
courts apparently have never had an opportunity to challenge the statute. And
further, for the purpose of this argument, should not the longevity of a statute
relating to divorce jurisdiction be measured from the date of the decision in the first
Williams case?
13. 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923). In recognizing the validity of a divorce decree
obtained by defendant husband, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that although
he was in fact a domiciliary of New York, he was privileged to take residence in a
foreign country and have his marital status adjudged by its courts, particularly since the
parties resided in the foreign country for seven years as man and wife.
14. 201 U.S. 562 (1906). The "matrimonial domicile" was that place where the separated parties last lived as man and wife. A foreign decree obtained at the last matrimonial domicile upon constructive service was recognized by New York. For example,
Schenker v. Schenker, 181 App. Div. 621, 169 N.Y. Supp. 35 (1st Dep't 1918), aff'd memo,
228 N.Y. 600, 127 N.E. 921 (1920); Callahan v. Callahan, 65 Misc. 172, 121 N.Y. Supp.
39 (Sup. Ct. 1909). On the other hand, a divorce obtained at the legal domicile of the
plaintiff was not recognized if the legal domicile was not also the matrimonial domicile.
For example, Olmstead v. Olmstead, 190 N.Y. 458, 83 N.E. 569 (1908); Gilson v. Airy,
181 App. Div. 761, 169 N.Y. Supp. 242 (1st Dep't 1918). See Greene, The Enforcement
of a Foreign Divorce Decree in New York, 11 Cornell L.Q. 141 (1926).
'15.

317 U.S. 287 (1942).

16. Oettgen v. Oettgen, 196 Misc. 937, 94 N.Y.S. 2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
17. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
18. The words, "Haddock v. Haddock is overruled," leave no doubt, 317 U.S. 287, 304
(1942).
19. Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), judgment vacated, 347 U.S. 965
(1954) (question moot), Noted 23 Ford. L.R. 206 (1994); Burch v. Burch, 195 F. 2d
799 (3d Cir. 1952); Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp. 987 (D.C., D.C. 1950); Sherman v. Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, 166 F. 2d 451 (3d Cir. 1948); Petition of
Smith, 71 F. Supp. 968 (D.C. N.J. 1947); Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 110, 111
(1934).
20. The statute was originally enacted in 1862.
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The case at bar would also distinguish the Williams case on the ground that the
Supreme Court was there concerned with interstate recognition of a divorce decree
and, therefore, solely concerned with the full faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution. It questions whether any constitutional question is presented here
since there is no issue raised as to interstate recognition. It argues that no constitutional issue is present because ". . . the whole subject of domestic relations is left
by the United States Constitution entirely to the States." 2' This, it is submitted,
is a half-truth and a misconception of the basic issue presented. The issue here is
jurisdiction, not regulation of domestic relations. Jurisdiction is a constitutional
question and always has been since the due process clause became a part of the
United States Constitution.
Due process has traditionally required jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
action. 22 It is submitted that domicile of at least one of the parties is necessary
for divorce jurisdiction, and anything less will violate due process. The court
in the instant decision remarks that it is at pains to know against whom there would
be a denial of due process. It is hard to fathom the court's perplexity. Obviously,
there is a denial of due process to the absentee defendant. He is a part), to the
marriage and most certainly has a prime interest in the marital status. If a state
cannot take away the property of an absentee defendant unless the prop2rty is
present in the state,23 should it be empowered to take away his interest in the marital relationship when the marital res is not present in the state?
This court finds the marital res is present in the fact that the marriage took place
in New York. The place of marriage, it contends, has a more intimate relationship
to the marital status than the domicile of the parties. Suppose H and W have lived
in New York all their lives. They take a brief sojourn to Maryland, are married
in that state, but immediately return to New York to live as man and wife. Is it
reasonable to say that Maryland has an interest greater than, or even equal to, the
interest of New York? Nor is it any help to compare, as does the decision in the
case at hand, marriage within the state with driving an automobile in a state, the
latter authorizing constructive service upon the non-resident motorist. Such an
analogy has a very perceptible limp and could lead to revolutionary jurisdictional
concepts 2 4
If jurisdiction for divorce be limited solely to the state wherein the marriage
took place, the problem of migratory divorce is solved, as the instant decision points
out. For there and there alone could a decree of divorce be entered. But might
this not substitute migratory marriage for migratory divorce? And does this not
21. 205 Misc. 836, 840, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
22. Due process is the "lawful judicial proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction."
In the Matter of the Estate of Milton S. Curry, 25 Hun 321, 323 (Gen. Term, N.Y.
1881); Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 US. 397 (1930); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
23. Pennington v. Fourth National Bank, 243 US. 269 (1917); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877) ; Geary v. Geary, 272 N.Y. 390, 6 N.E.2d 67 (1936).
24. One logical sequence would be to permit constructive service on the absentee maker
of a promissory note merely because the note was issued in the state. But ...
marriage
... is something more than a mere contract. . . .It is an institution, in the maintenance
of which . .. the public is deeply interested. . . ." Maynard v. Hill, 125 US. 190, 211
(1888). The state has an interest, and the domicillary state has prime interest in that
status because at least one of the parties lives there.
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sacrifice the traditional and intimate interest of the domiciliary state in the marriage relation on the altar of uniformity? If, on the other hand, either the domicile
of one of the parties or the place of marriage should be held to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement, confusion is engendered. For if we have two criteria for divorce
jurisdiction we would again have the possibility of the pre-Willlams spectacle-a man married in one state and single in another. As section 1147 of the Civil
Practice Act stands, we will have two criteria for divorce jurisdiction unless and
until the United'States Supreme Court strikes down the statute.

DOmEsTIc R.ELATIONS-CONsTRUCTION OF A SEPARATION AoREEMENT.-Plaintff
wife procured a Nevada divorce, incorporating the terms of a Connecticut separation agreement which provided for periodic support payments and the maintenance
of life insurance by defendant husband until she should remarry. Subsequently plaintiff married X and defendant ceased performing the terms of the separation agreement. X also had been divorced in Nevada and shortly after the remarriage his
first wife obtained a divorce from him in New York on the ground of adultery, the
court holding his Nevada decree to be invalid presumably for failure to comply
with Nevada residence requirements. Thereupon, plaintiff procured an annulment in
New York on the ground that her marriage to X was invalid, and commenced this
action to have the separation agreement revived. The Supreme Court at trial term
permitted a resumption of 'support. On appeal to the Appellate Division, one justice dissenting, held, reversed. Plaintiff's remarriage, although annulled, terminated
defendant's obligations under the support agreement. Gaines v. Jacobson, 283 App.
Div. 325, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 909 (1st Dep't 1954).
The effect of a decree of annulment on the strictly matrimonial rights of the parties is well settled in New York, but there is some conflict where incidental or consequential rights are involved. Both void and voidable marriages are viewed as
void ab initio in New York since the court's construction of the annulment statute'
in the leading case of In Matter of Moncrief.2 A marriage void for incest or bigamy
is invalid since its inception and requires no decree to that effect,8 whereas a
voidable marriage is valid until its nullity is declared by a court of competent
jurisdiction, but once so declared, the decree is retroactive to the date of the marriage.4 The legislature 'gaw the danger of an uncompromising following of the logic
of the Moncrief decision and enacted Section 1135 of the Civil Practice Act to
cover the legitimization of children born during the union.5 Uncompromising logic
has not been the keynote where rights ancilliary to the marital rights of the annulled union were involved.6 The courts uniformly agree that the annulled mar1. N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 7 dealing with voidable marriages, if interpreted
literally declares such a marriage void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
2. 235 N.Y. 390, 139 N.E. 550 (1923). A decree of annulment bastardized Issue born
during the union, since the decree was retroactive to the date of the marriage.
3. Patterson v. Gaines 6 How. 550 (U.S. 1848). 1 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce, and
Separation § 258 (1891).
4. In Matter of Moncrief, 235 N.Y. 390, 139 N.E. 550 (1923).
5. N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 1135 (1919).
6. Frank et al. v. Carter, 219 N.Y. 35, 113 N.E. 549 (1916). (Contract for purchases
of necessaries by "wife" upheld); Foster v. American Radiator Co., 249 App. Dlv. 460,
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riage may have validity for certain purposes but they disagree as to what purposes.
Thus a suit for recovery of gifts in consideration of marriage was denied,7 and
similarly one by a husband for return of payments made to the state for the
support of his insane wife.8 The legal and moral obligations involved in these
and kindred cases raise issues readily severable from the strictly matrimonial rights
and duties of the union and have a reality which cannot be disregarded or overlooked.9
The leading case of Sleicher v. Sleicherz o raised much more of a matrimonial
question as it involved support payments, and its facts are substantially the same
as those in the present case. An alimony decree was given granting payments until
the wife should remarry. Subsequently she did remarry. The support payments
were terminated; the second marriage was annulled for the husband's fraud in
concealing the fact that he was insane up to and at the time of the marriage, and
the wife sued to have the support payments by the first marriage revived. A
unanimous court denied her rights to payments by the first husband during the
time of the existence of the second union, since the second husband was then
legally obliged to support her and presumably did so." However, as to the revival of support payments from the date of the annulment decree, the court followed the logic of the Moncrief decision, and ordered the resumption of payments,
holding the remarriage left her unmarried for that purpose.
In 1940, the legislature gave the court discretionary power to order support
payments by the husband in an annulment action. 2 Yetman v. Yelman,1 3 decided
after the enactment of the new statute, construed the statute as modifying the
Sleicher decision so as to hold the second husband primarily liable, but still leaving
the first husband secondarily liable.
The dissenting opinion in the present case held that the Sleicher decision controlled, but the majority decided that the support agreement was primarily a
matter of contractual construction, and that the parties intended the fact of remarriage, rather than the validity of a remarriage to terminate the husband's
obligations under the support agreement.' 4 While the legal meaning of a term
292 N.Y. Supp. 894 (3d Dep't 1937) (recovery of Workmen's Compensation benefits payable to widow denied).
7. American Surety Co. v. Connor, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783 (1929).
8. Willians v. State, 175 Misc. 972, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 968 (Ct. CL 1941).
9. Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929). Cardozo C.J., writing for
the majority, said that while the annulment destroyed the marriage it could not obliterate the past and make events unreal
10. 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929). Accord: Matter of Remro v. Reid Ice Cream
Co., 279 N.Y. 83, 17 N.E.2d 778 (1938).
11. Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929). (Common law rule).
12. N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 1140a (1940).
13. 91 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
14. Gaines v. Jacobson, 283 App. Div. 325, 328, 331, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 909, 911, 915
(1st Dep't 1954) ". . . although the wife's remarriage was annulled and is therefore null
and void from its inception for many purposes, it was nevertheless, for the purpose of
construing the separation agreement under which the wife claims, sufficient to terminate
the obligations of the husband under it. . .. But the question in this cas is what did
the separation agreement contemplate by the term 'remarry,' and not what is the status
of the parties to an annulled marriage."
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must be considered, still the canon of construction, noscitur a sociis, that is, that
a word must be construed in the light of the words accompanying it, should also
be followed in determining what was the intention of the parties to the instrument. The majority opinion did not comment upon it, but the fact that the support agreement provided for the discontinuance of insurance payments by the
husband upon remarriage of the wife, would seem to indicate that the act alone
of remarriage would terminate the agreement, when the possibility that the husband might not later be able to obtain insurance, and the fact that he would
have to pay a greater premium are considered. Section 1172c of the Civil Practice
Act 15 permits a divorced husband to suspend alimony payments at the discretion
of the court, where the husband can prove the wife is living with another man and
holding herself out to be the wife of the other man. Where the husband can prove
she is actually the wife of the other man, the court must suspend the payments.
Further, 1140a of the Civil Practice Act permits a court in its discretion in an
annulment action to award the wife support from the husband. Certainly the legislature has given some status to the annulled marriage. Also the courts have recognized that in some cases the meaning of words as used by laymen must be the
meaning in common parlance and they may afford a status to a term that strict
legalism could not sustain.16 Sections 1172c and 1140a were existing law at the
time the separation agreement was made and at the time plaintiff married X.
Plaintiff certainly knew at the time of the remarriage of the terms of the separation agreement as she notified defendant to discontihue the payments. She
must be presumed to have known something of X's affairs; she had legal counsel
and as the court said "she gambled on the law, and lost."' 7
It is submitted that this decision is good law, further limiting as it does, the
effects of annulments to the marital status of the parties and should help to discourage speculation with marriage laws.
LABOR LAw-ACTION FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AS

DEFINED BY THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT HELD WITHIN STATE'S JURISDICTION.-PCtitioner, through its agents, so threatened and intimidated respondent's officers and
employees by various unfair labor practices as defined by section 8 (b) (I) (A) of
the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 as to cause the respondent to be unable to complete its interstate contract commitments. The respondent brought an
action in tort for damages in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, which
gave relief. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the trial court's
decision. On certiorari, held, two justices dissenting, affirmed. The Act did not so
pre-empt the field as to give the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter

of the action. United Construction Workers et al. v. Laburnum Construction Corp.,
347 U.S. 656 (1954).
15.
16.

N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 1172c (1938).
See Hartigan v. Casualty Co. of America, 227 N.Y. 175, 179, 124 N.E. 789, 790
(1919) where the court, even though it recognized that the status of partners was not
that of a separate legal entity but an aggregate of individuals, said: "The partnerships

in this case are not for all purposes to be regarded as legal entities, but for the purpose
of ascertaining the intention of the parties to the policy herein, we are governed by
common parlance rather than legal parlance."
17. Gaines v. Jacobson, 283 App. Div. 325, 329, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 909, 913 (1st Dep't
1954).
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The instant case is one more link in the line of cases which has been brought
before the United States Supreme Court to determine the respective areas of state
and federal jurisdiction in the field of labor relations in interstate commerce. In recent years there has been a definite trend on the part of the Court to hold the field
covered by the Act' pre-empted, thereby precluding state court intervention. The
trend culminated in the recent case of Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers
Union2 which was interpreted by many as a general pre-emption of tte field of labor
relations affecting interstate commerce by giving exclusive jurisdiction to the
NLRB. 3 It soon became apparent, however, that the broad language of the Court
in the Garner case was subject to a narrow interpretation if the holding were limited
to the precise facts presented. 4
The narrow interpretation of the Garner case may be found in the answer to the
question before the Court as to ". . . whether the state, through its courts, may
adjudge the same controversy and extend its own form of relief."5 The Court's
response to that query was a reaffirmation of the line of cases beginning with Bethlehen Steel Co. v. New York State Lab. Rel. Bd.0 which held that where the LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947 in any way prevailed over the subject matter
in controversy, the state's jurisdiction is precluded. The Court discussed at length
the doctrine of private and public rights and came to the conclusion that, "Whatever purpose a classification of rights as public or private may serve, it is too unsettled and ambiguous to introduce into constitutional law as a dividing line between
federal and state power or jurisdiction. . . . We conclude that when federal power
constitutionally is exerted for the protection of public or private interests, or both,
it becomes the supreme law of the land and cannot be curtailed... by a state...
because it will apply some doctrine of private right." 7 This broad language leaves
little doubt but that where an activity is defined by the Labor-Mttanagement Relations Act of 1947, the state's jurisdiction is subordinated to federal jurisdiction even
though the subject matter may fall within the private rights doctrine.8 This is significant for it has been contended that Congress never intended to give the NLRB
exclusive jurisdiction over cases which involved private rights.
1. Labor-fanagement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 141 et seq. (1947).
2.

346 U.S. 485 (1953).

3. In the cases argued before the court from 1950 to 1953 involving state jurisdiction
over unfair labor practices as defined by the Act, the Court found that the labor activities over which the states assumed jurisdiction were either protected or prohibited by the
LMRA of 1947. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v.
Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1950); United Auto Workers v. O'Brien, 339
U.S. 454 (1950); Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 338 US. 953
(1950).
4. Shute, State Versus Federal Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes: The Garner Case, 19
Mo. L. Rev. 119 (1954); Rose, Garner v. Teamsters-The Supreme Court and Private
Rights, 40 Va. L. Rev. 117 (1954).
5. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 US. 485,
489 (1953).
6. 330 US. 767 (1947).

7. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 US. 485,
500 (1953).

8. The underlying reasoning of the judiciary's acceptance of pre-emption is to alleviate any conflict which might arise between the state and federal substantive law.
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Petitioners in the instant case contended that the state courts lack jurisdiction
of the subject matter on the ground that the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947 has occupied the field of unfair labor activities in interstate industry and has
given exclusive jurisdiction to the NLRB. They argue further that the court in the
Garner case had so pre-empted the field as to deny the state courts all jurisdiction
over union activities. But the Court refused to hold in the case under discussion
that the field had been so pre-empted as to preclude a common-law action for
damages in the state court.
The instant case is neither an alarming nor first exception to the broad rule of
pre-emption laid down in the Garner case, for even the holding in that case indicated
that there were certain areas where a state may properly assert jurisdiction. 10 The
first exception is that a state may always exercise its police power when public
12
safety is at stake," and as pointed out in Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board
it would take an act of Congress to change this rule. Another possible limitation
may be found in the rule laid down in Irving Grating Subway Co. v. Silverman.10
There it was held that where the NLRB refuses to exercise its jurisdiction over
subject matter within its control, the parties may pursue their remedies in the
state court.' 4 The instant case is a third major limitation to the pre-emption theory.
The court reasoned that since Congress had not provided a procedure for the collection of damages arising from the commission of unfair labor practices, it would
deprive an injured party of relief if the state court remedy were precluded. The
Court pointed out that, "If Virginia is denied jurisdiction in this case, it will mean
that where federal preventive administrative procedures are impotent or inadequate,
the offenders, by coercion of the type found here, may destroy property without liability for the damage done."' 5
Although the issue of jurisdiction in actions for damages arising out of unfair
labor practices has been settled by the Court in the instant case, 10 the unanswered
9. This view is discussed in Rose, The Labor-Management Relations Act and the States
Power to Grant Relief, 39 Va. L. Rev. 765 (1953); and more specifically in Rose, Garner
v. Teamsters: The Supreme Court and Private Rights, 40 Va. L. Rev. 177 (1954). When

Congress passed the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (1935), it appeared that It had
given the NLRB "exclusive" jurisdiction over unfair labor practices affecting interstate
commerce, but with the enactment of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.A. 141 et seq. (1947), however, the word "exclusive" was stricken from the Act, thus indicating that Congress wished
the state courts to have a more comprehensive jurisdiction over labor practices.
10. In the Garner case itself the Court stated ".

.

. that the state still may exercise

its historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety. . . ." Garner v.
Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
11. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1939); Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306
U.S. 79 (1939); Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
12. 315 U.S. 740 (1941).
13. 117 F. Supp. 67 (ED. N.Y. 1953).
14. United Mine Workers, 92 N.L.R.B. 916 (1950); Colonial Hardwood, 84 N.L.R.B.
563 (1949).
15. United Const. Workers et al. v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 659 (1954).
16. This question has plagued the state courts for some time. In the recent case of
Russell v. International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, et al., 258 Ala. 615, 64 So. 2d 384 (1953), the Supreme Court of
Alabama was confronted with facts similar to those in the instant case. Although holding
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problem remains as to what remedies would be available if the respondent in this
action had asked for an injunction against the threats and violence as well as
damages. As the law now stands it would seem that the parties would be burdened
with a proceeding before the NLRB and an action before the state court arising
out of the same facts. Such a multiplicity of suits could only have the effect of
hindering the purpose of Congress' recent legislation and the judiciary's recent
decisions in the field, i.e., complete uniformity in the field of labor practices in
17
interstate industry.

LABOR LAW-JUimsDIcTioN O FEDERAL COURTS IN SUIT BY UNION TO RECOVER
DUE MEMBERS OF UNIo.-Plaintiff labor union is the bargaining representative of a large group of defendant's salaried employees, some 4,000 of whom
did not work on a certain day and consequently were not paid for that day. Plaintiff
asserts that this failure to pay was violative of the collective bargaining agreement
in effect between it and defendant and therefore seeks as part of the relief demanded in the complaint, an accounting to determine the amounts of the withheld
salaries and a judgment running in favor of the individual employees found to be
entitled thereto. Plaintiff claims the latter on the theory that the individual employees are third party beneficiaries of the contract between the union and the defendant and that the union represents them in this action as well as itself. Defendant presented three grounds in its motion to dismiss: (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, (2) wrong party plaintiff, and (3) failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The district court decided the issues of jurisdiction
and proper party in plaintiff's favor, but dismissed the claim on the merits. On
appeal before the full bench, held, three judges dissenting, complaint dismissed. The
dismissal, however, should have been based on the lack of federal jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. 2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954).
The principal issue involved herein is whether a failure by an employer to pay
employees a certain day's wages can be considered a breach of the wage provisions
of the collective bargaining contract in force between the union and the employer
in addition to being a breach of the employee's right to wages under his individual
contract of hire. The action was brought under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act which gives to the federal courts jurisdiction in suits by or
WAGES

for state jurisdiction over a tort action for damages, the court noted that it would prefer
that the United States Supreme Court express its judgment on this question before committing the Supreme Court of Alabama to a change in the law.
17. In United Brick and Clay Workers of America, et al. v. Deen. Artware, Inc., 198
F. 2d 637, rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 919 (1952) the court noted that its finding was contrary to the finding in the companion case of National Labor Relations Board v. Deena
Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953)

even though the causes

of action stemmed from the identical facts. The court explained away the inconsistency
by stating that, "Under our existing system of courts, juries, administrative agencies, and
appellate review, such findings, even though inconsistent, are not invalid, and one does
not destroy the other." The court goes on to state that it is inevitable that where given
facts are presented to more than one fact finding body, inconsistencies will arise.
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against1 labor organizations for damages for breach of collective bargaining agreements.
The majority denied jurisdiction on the ground that a suit for wages arises
solely out of the individual's contract of hire, not out of the collective agreement, and therefore a contract between a labor organization and an employer,
2
essential to any action under 301(a), is not involved. It is submitted that, since
by the better view the terms of the collective contract are incorporated into the
3
individual's contract of hire by implication of law, a refusal by an employer to
circumstances expressly prounder
paid
be
should
which
wages,
employee
pay an
vided for in the collective agreement, is necessarily a breach of both contracts. Since
wage provisions are benefits running directly to the individual employees, the union
should have been allowed to bring suit in its own name and as representative of the
employees injured.4 The dissenting judges were of the opinion that the refusal to
pay was a breach of the collective contract because, while the employment status
of the individual arises out of his individual hiring, certain of his rights, including
the one in question, are the "legal consequences" of enforceable promises in the
collective bargaining agreement made to the union for the benefit of all who are
employees while the collective bargain is in force. It is true that no duty to pay
wages to a particular employee is derived solely from the collective contract, which
specifies the wage rate, and that it is the actual employment which creates the obligation to pay the specified wage rate, for which the employee as an individual never
bargained. 5
No employee, therefore, derives a right to be paid at a certain rate, or to be
paid on a day he does not work, simply because he is hired by the employer. It
is the combined consideration furnished by the union which controls the labor supply and by the employee who does the work which creates the employer's obligation to pay. Therefore, many courts, while recognizing the different purposes served
by the collective contract and the contract of hire, consider them as one for the
practical purposes of suit 6 and allow a union to bring an action in its own right
1. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (Supp. 1952).
2. The union also sought a declaratory judgment under § 28 of the Declaratory judgment Act as was done in the case of United Protective Workers of America v. Ford
Motor Co., 194 F. 2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952). The court, however, did not discuss this particular issue since, in the majority view, there was no violation of the collective bargaining contract and hence no federal jurisdiction under 301(a).
3. "But, however engaged, an employee becomes entitled by virtue of the Labor Relations Act somewhat as a third party beneficiary to all benefits of the collective trade
agreement, even if on his own he would yield to less favorable terms. The individual
hiring contract is subsidiary to the terms of the trade agreement, and may not waive any
of its benefits. . . ." J.I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332,
336 (1944).
4. United Shoe Workers v. Le Danne Footwear, 83 F. Supp. 714 (D.C. Mass. 1949).
5. J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944).
6. United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F. 2d 997 (7th
Cir. 1952).
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as principal obligee and in the name of the employees as beneficiaries.7 While the
majority of the court expressly rejects application of the third party beneficiary
theory of contract to collective bargaining contracts, it is submitted that it is the
only theory practically adaptable to the situation involved herein and is the most
effective way of accomplishing the apparent congressional intent in affording federal jurisdiction under Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The majority acknowledges that its decision conflicts with the decision in
the case of American Federation of Labor v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 8 which
allowed the union to recover in a suit to require the employer to pay a pension
to one of its employees. The majority refers frequently, however, to the case of
0
in support of
Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Associated Milk Dealers
the theory that a suit for wages is based solely on the individual contract of hire.
It should be noted that the latter case was decided before passage of the TaftHartley Act, and while the court there did adhere to the majority's contention in
case did not entirely deprive the union of relief
the case at bar, the court in that
10
as does the decision in this case.
A point not stressed by the court, but seemingly vital to the problem involved
in this case, is the attitude of Congress toward the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Admittedly, one important reason for permitting suits for
breach of collective contracts to be brought in the federal courts was to provide
a practical method for recovering judgments against unincorporated unions for
breach of their contracts..' However, the apparent intent of Congress was not
simply to make unions more vulnerable to suits by employers, but was also to
strengthen the mutual obligations of both labor and management to abide by the
terms of their collective agreements. 12 Congress intended to increase responsibility
on both sides by giving such agreements a fully enforceable contract status, and
accordingly authorized suits for damages in federal courts for a breach by either
party . 3 The basic concern was for the integrity of the agreement itself. Under
7. Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International Union v. National Biscuit Co.,
177 F. 2d 684 (3rd Cir. 1949); Local 937 v. Royal Typewriter Co., 85 F. Supp. 669
(D.C. Conn. 1949); United Shoe Workers v. Le Danne Footwear, 83 F. Supp. 714 (D.C.
Mass. 1949); American Federation of Labor v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 179 F. 2d
535 (6th Cir. 1950).
8. 179 F. 2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950).
9. 42 F. Supp. 584 (NJ). Ill. 1941).
10. In the Milk Wagon Drivers' case the court had jurisdiction because of diversity
of citizenship and the court said that since the right of the individual employees to recover their wages depended on the construction of the collective bargaining agreement and
since the union and the employer were in disagreement as to the meaning of the wage
provision contained therein, the union was entitled to maintain an action for a judgment
declaring the proper construction of such provision.
11. Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947).
12. "The committee bill makes the collective bargaining contract equally binding and
enforceable on both parties." Ibid.
13. "Though recognized as a valid contract for the purpose of injunctive relief, the
collective bargaining agreement was not granted full contract status until the passage of
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947?' Kaye and Allen, Union
Responsibility and the Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 30 B.U.L.
Rev. 1 (1950).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 23

Section 301(a) for such Congressional intent to become effective, both parties
should have ready access to the federal courts to obtain relief for a breach of any
term of that contract which is supposed to symbolize the good faith of labor and
management in their fundamental dealings with each other. 14 The preamble to the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 states as one of its purposes to "... equalize
legal responsibilities of labor organizations and employers." The most effective
enforcement of an agreement by an employer to pay to employees, collectively represented by a union, the compensation set forth in the collective agreement, is to be
found in an action by the union for their collective benefit.
If, therefore, the collective contract involved here contains a provision that employees are to be paid a specified wage for days on which they do not work, and
the employer refuses to abide by that provision, it would destroy the mutuality
of obligation, aimed at by Congress, to deny the union its right to sue simply because the individual employee also has a common law action for lost wages under
his separate contract of hire. In most cases of this type the individual employees
affected would not sue the employer for private reasons or because of the expense
involved. The union, on the other hand, as a matter of policy or principle, or to
protect the rights of all employees under the collective agreement, not only may
wish to sue but is in the better position, financially and otherwise, to do so.16 Under
the holding in the instant case unions would be powerless to prevent, by way of
ordinary legal action,16 violations of wage provisions of collective contracts, no
matter how flagrant such violations may be. Such a holding appears to defeat the
attempt of Congress to make collective agreements enforceable in federal courts.

MASTER-SERvANT-RULE

Or RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AS APPLIED TO PHYSICIAN

SERVANTS.-As a prerequisite to plaintiff's application for employment with defendant, a physical examination and blood test were performed on plaintiff by
defendant's physician. The physician's negligence in performing the test caused
plaintiff a permanent injury. Plaintiff sued the defendant corporation under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. On appeal from a verdict in favor of plaintiff,
held, two justices dissenting, affirmed. Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit Inc., 283 App.
Div. 105, 126 N.Y.S. 2d 383 (1st Dep't 1953).
The issue presented in the instant case, whether an employer is liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligence of its physician, has been before
the New York courts on many occasions. They have adhered to the rule that
where the physician is performing a professional act (as distinguished from an
administrative act) he is an independent contractor and his employer is relieved
of liability.' This rule, first applied to charitable hospitals, later found extension
14. "In the judgment of the committee, breaches of collective bargaining agreements
have become so numerous that it is not sufficient to allow the parties .. .to invoke the
processes of the National Labor Relations Board when such breaches occur .... We feel
that the aggrieved party should also have a right of action in the Federal Courts." Sen.
Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947).
15. 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 163 (1947 Supp.).
16. As distinct from whatever equitable relief may be available and the traditional
economic weapons which may be legitimately used by unions.
1. Schneider v. New York Telephone Company, 249 App. Div. 400, 292 N.Y. Supp.
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to non-charitable hospitals and commercial enterprises maintaining medical departments. 2 The employer is liable as a result of the negligent selection or negligent
retention of a physician, 3 but this liability is a direct rather than a vicarious one.
The problem in New York has been to distinguish the professional from the
non-professional act. 4 The distinction is embodied in the definition of an independent contractor, "that if the employer has no control over the manner and
method used in performing the act, the performer is an independent contractor."
Control of the end result is not sufficient. An obvious example would be the acts
performed by a physician in the process of an operation. They are professional;
0
there is no control by the employer over the manner and methods used. It has
been indicated that the act of extracting blood for the purpose of a blood test
is a professional act for the same reason. In Bryant v. Presbyterian Hospitalr
the Court of Appeals held that a penicillin injection administered by a physician
was a professional act.
The majority in the instant case did not contend that the act performed was
not professional, but based its decisions on the plaintiff's inability to choose the
physician, the employer-employee relationship between the physician and the defendant, the sole benefit theory, and the lack of physician-patient relationship. The
dissenting opinion, pointing to the absence of control, called the act professional.
Heretofore New York Courts have held that the right to choose a physician is
not decisive. The fact that the employer has the exclusive right to choose the
physician of itself, would not appear to make him liable for the physician's subsequent acts. 8 A physician may be regularly employed by the employer and paid
399 (Ist Dep't 1937), aff'd, 276 N.Y. 655, 13 N.E.2d 47 (1938); Stone v. Goodman,
241 App. Div. 290, 271 N.Y. Supp. 500 (Ist Dep't 1934); Matter of Renouf v. New
York Central Railroad Company, 254 N.Y. 349, 173 N.E. 218 (1930); Schlendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
2. Schneider v. New York Telephone Company, 249 App. Div. 400, 292 N.Y. Supp.
399 (Ist Dep't 1937), affkd, 276 N.Y. 655, 13 N.E.2d 47 (1938).
3. Claude L. Stage v. Michigan Central Railroad Company, 199 App. Div. 675, 191
N.Y. Supp. 824 (4th Dep't 1922); Laubhein v. De Koninglyke Neder Landsche Stoom-

boot Mlaatschappy, 107 N.Y. 228, 13 N.E. 781 (1887).
4. Professional Acts: Negligence in operation by a physician was held a professional
act; hospital had no control over manner and method of performing the act. Schlendorri
v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). Administrative
Acts: Hot water bottle left in bed by a nurse before the patient was put in bed. lacano
v. New York Polyclinic Hospital, 269 App. Div. 955, 58 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1945),
aff'd, 296 N.Y. 502, 68 N.E. 2d 450. Electric light bulb left under the bedsheet by attendant; Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E.2d 373 (1940).
Negligence in operation of an ambulance; Sheehan v. North County Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E. 2d 28 (1937).

5. Schneider v. New York Telephone Company, 249 App. Div. 400, 292 N.Y. Supp.
399 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 276 N.Y. 655, 13 N.E.2d 47 (1938); Matter of Renouf v.
New York Central Railroad Company, 254 N.Y. 349, 173 N.E. 218 (1930); Schlendorla
v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
6. Schlendorif v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
7. 304 N.Y. 538, 110 N.E.2d 391 (1953).
8. Laubhein v. De Koninglyke Neder Landsche Stoomboot Mfaatschappy, 107 N.Y.
228, 13 N.E. 781 (1887).
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a salary, but this does not take him out of the category of independent contractor
when performing a professional act.0
The sole benefit theory alluded to by the majority has never been held to be
the law of New York. In the Minnesota case, Jones v. Tri-State Telephone &
Telegraph Company,10 one of the decisions cited in the majority opinion, plaintiff
sought damages for injuries caused in the negligent taking of an x-ray. The
plaintiff was forced to submit to the x-ray examination under threat of discharge
by his employer. He had received an injury while in the employ of the defendant
and the main purpose of the examination was to gather evidence for a potential
law suit. The court stated that acts of the physician were for the sole benefit
of the employer, and that the master was liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. "Sole benefit" is a deceptive term. When would a person derive absolutely no benefit from treatment by a physician? It seems that the facts in the
Minnesota case would be as close as possible to such a situation, yet does not
the plaintiff derive benefit, if only in a negative way, from the x-ray pictures?
Apparently the term "sole benefit" is used by the court to signify a greater portion of the benefit. The New York Court of Appeals has apparently never adopted
this "sole benefit" theory. In fact, in Schneider v. N. Y. Telephone Company," it
appears to have repudiated it. In the Schneider case a physician, employed by
the defendant, negligently x-rayed the plaintiff in the wrong part of the body for
an injury which he had sustained outside of his employment. The purpose of
the examination was to determine whether or not the plaintiff could continue to
work without any ill effect. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant company was not liable. May it not be said that the company derived as much benefit in that case?
The majority in the instant case also cited decisions from California, Missouri,
and Maryland. 12 The so-called sole benefit theory has been applied in those
9. Schneider v. N.Y. Telephone Company, 249 App. Div. 400, 292 N.Y. Supp. 399
(1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 276 N.Y. 655, 13 N.E.2d 47 (1938).
10. 118 Minn. 217, 136 N.W. 741 (1912).
11. 249 App. Div. 400, 292 N.Y. Supp. 399 (1st Dep't 1937), afi'd, 276 N.Y. 655, 13
N.E.2d 47 (1938).
12. In Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Company, 26 Cal. 2d 149, 157 P. 2d 1 (1945),
the employer was held liable for physician employee's negligence in performing an
operation the need for which was disclosed by a pre-employment examination. The law
of California on which this decision is based, as expounded in Rice v. California Lutheran Hospital, 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P. 2d 860 (1945), is that if a physician is a servant
of the hospital, the doctrine of respondeat superior is applied for negligent acts of tho
physician, even though he is performing a professional act, unless it is a charitable
hospital. In Ebert v. Emerson Electric Manufacturing Company, 264 S.W. 453 (Mo. 1924)
the employer company was held liable for negligent acts of physician. However, the law
of Missouri as expressed in Hamilton v. Standard Oil Company, 323 Mo. 531, 19 S.W. 2d
679 (1929) is that where a physician employed by a non-hospital corporation treats
an injured employee, the corporation is liable. The negligence is imputed to the corporation. In Woodburn v. Standard Forgings Corporation, 112 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.
1940), the act of the physician was administrative. In Disbman v. United States, 93
F. Supp. 567 (D.C. Md. 1950), the court said, the test is whether the physician acted
within the scope of employment or not. The Maryland law as cited by the court exempts
only charitable hospitals from the doctrine of respondeat superior.
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jurisdictions; however, these states exempt only hospitals from liability for negligent acts of physicians. The latter clearly is not the law of New York.
The majority also pointed up the lack of physician-patient relationship. The
New York courts have been silent on this factor in deciding whether or not a
company is liable for the negligence of the physician. It seems, however, that
there is such a relationship in the instant case. The physician was performing a
blood test, which is required by the New York City Sanitary Code to prevent
the employment of people afflicted with a communicable disease. It was necessary
for the plaintiff to submit to this test as a prerequisite for employment in a food
establishment. 13 Certainly if the physician were one of her own choosing the
relationship would have existed,14 and since in New York the right of selection
does not appear to be controlling, the same relationship should exist under the
present facts.' 5
In numerous decisions, New York courts have said that an employer who employs a physician for the performance of purely professional acts is not responsible for the negligent performance of those acts. The plaintiff was not forced
to submit to the blood test. She did so of her own volition in order to obtain
employment, albeit in compliance with the requirement laid down by the Sanitary Code of the City of New York. The court may be attempting to restrict
the general New York rule to cases where the person treated is a present employee. No sound reason has been given for such a restriction.

REs JunIcATA-DocTREN

ABANDONED WHEE

rvs

APPLICATION

WoutD ImPAM

JUsTCE.--Appellant contracted with the City of Fort Lauderdale to construct recreational improvements on city-owned property. The former agreed to construct
without charge to the latter "additional buildings" of the value of $212,500. Appellant completed instead "additional improvements" of the alleged value of $372,000.
In an equity suit by citizens of Fort Lauderdale to compel performance, the Cir.cuit Court held the contractor had failed to construct additional buildings as required by the contract, entered a money judgment in favor of the city and rejected
the counterclaim of the contractor for the value of the additional improvements.
On appeal, judgment was affirmed. In a separate suit by appellant to recover in
quantum meruit for the additional improvements, the Supreme Court of Florida
held, res judicata would not be applied although the same cause of action was involved in a former equity suit between the same parties. Universal Const. Co. v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, - Fla. -, 68 So. 2d 366 (1953).

The court does not overlook the principles upon which the doctrine of res judicata
is based, but states that the doctrine should not be controlling under all facts and
circumstances. It should not be so strictly applied as to defeat the ends of justice.
This is contrary to the universal rule of law that "A judgment is none the less
binding because it may be manifestly unjust."' The conclusiveness of a judgment
13. Sanitary Code and Regulations § 148 Regulation 22.
14. Bryant v. Presbyterian Hospital, 304 N.Y. 538, 110 N.E.2d 391 (1953).
15. Laubhein v. De Koninglyke Neder Landsche Stoomboot Maatschappy, 107 N.Y. 228,
13 N.. 781 (1887).
1. 2 Freeman, Judgments § 728 (5th Ed. 1925); Philbrook v. Newman, 148 Cal. 172,
82 Pac. 772 (1905); Mueller v. Derwae, 175 Wis. 580, 185 N.W. 202 (1921).
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is not impaired by the fact that it can be shown to be clearly erroneous. 2 If the
requisites for application of res judicata are met, a final decree of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, not
only as to those questions actually decided, but as to all issues which might properly
have been raised and litigated in that action.3
Application of the doctrine of res judicata requires that the suit be between the
same parties and involve the same cause of action. The question must be settled
by a final judgment rendered upon the merits.4 Judgment on an asserted counterclaim operates as a bar in the same manner as a judgment on a complaint.5
It has been suggested that the doctrine of res judicata precludes the parties from
showing what is or may be the truth.6 However valid this may be, it has been held
that private right and public welfare demand that a question adjudicated be considered as finally settled and conclusive on the parties.7 Curtailment of multiple
actions helps eliminate harassment of litigants, waste of time of the courts already
overburdened, and double recovery. Its most important effect, however, is the production of certainty as to individual rights, thereby promoting stability in the relations of men.8 The obvious benefit to the general welfare resulting from the
strict application of this rule has been considered to outweigh the isolated cases of
individual hardship.0
The doctrine of res judicata has been the subject of much recent critical examination and some courts have attempted to alleviate the alleged harshness of the
rule by refusing to apply the doctrine or by creating exceptions thereto.1 0 In
Wallace v. Luxmoore," cited as precedent in the instant case, the Florida court
announced that when the factual situation is such that the application of res judicata
would defeat justice, it will apply a different rule. This pronouncement was dictum,
however, as was a similar statement of the California court in Di Callo v. AngelonLl'
Such views are nevertheless illustrative of a trend toward refusal to apply res
judicata either on the grounds of resulting injustice or that the underlying policies
of the rule are inapplicable to the facts. A recent decision based on the latter
2. Freeman & Co. v. Regan Co., 332 Ill.
App. 637, 76 N.E. 2d 514 (1947); 2 Freeman, Judgments § 727 (Sth Ed. 1925).
3. City of Elmhurst v. Kegerries, 392 IMl. 195, 64 N.E. 2d 450 (1946).
4. Gordon v. Gordon, - Fla. -, 59 So. 2d 40 (1952).
5. Roberts v. Greene, 310 Ky. 178, 220 S.W. 2d 390 (1949); Mitchell v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 165 S.C. 457, 164 S.E. 136 (1932); Developments in the LawRes Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 831 (1952).
6. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942).
7. Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276 (1904); State Hospital v. Consolidated Water
Supply Co., 257 Pa. St. 29, 110 Adt. 281 (1920).
8. Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yale L. J. 299 (1929).
9. Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932).
10. White v. Adler, 289 N.Y. 34, 43 N.E. 2d 798 (1942); Howell v. State Bank, 149
Wash. 249, 270 Pac. 831 (1928); State ex rel. White Pine Sash Co. v. Superior Court, 145
Wash. 249, 261 Pac. 110 (1927). See also, Cleary, Res Judicata Re-examined, 57 Yale
L.J. 339 (1948).
11. 156 Fla. 725, 24 So. 2d 304 (1946).
12. 3 Cal. 2d 255, 44 P. 2d 562 (1935). Settlement and approval of the intermediate
account of a guardian was held not to have the effect of a final judgment.
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ground is Adams v. Pearson,13 in which the Illinois Supreme Court found the cause
of action to be one normally barred by res judicata. However, as the case pre' 14
where the policies underlying the
sented "a unique and nonrecurrent situation
doctrine of res judicata were not applicable to the peculiar facts involved, the court
refused to apply the doctrine and granted the relief sought.
While it is true that adherence to the doctrine of res judicata has at times pro5
duced unreasonable and inequitable results,1 nevertheless the damage resulting
from the relaxation of the rule would seem greatly to outweigh any benefit obtained
through relief of particular injuries. The ensuing uncertainty, for example, as to
such matters as real estate title and marital status could produce incalculable disorder.
Since, as held in the instant case, a final judgment could be disregarded in the
discretion of the court, the question arises as to whether such judgment would be
entitled to full faith and credit in a sister state. If open to attack in Florida, it
would be open to attack elsewhere. However, as the extent of adherence to the
doctrine of res judicata would be determined by the inherent justice of each particular case there would be no fixed criterion by which another state would ascertain
when a Florida judgment was open to attack. Formulation of a universal rule making
definite those situations where res judicata would not be applied seems impossible
of achievement. Res judicata is an ancient and time-tested doctrine. It is submitted that the facts in the instant case present no persuasive reason for its abandonment.
ToRTs-CAUsAL RELATiON BETwEEN VirATro. AND DArAGF-Plahntiffs seek
damages for the death of one policeman and injuries to another resulting from an
explosion of gasoline caused by arsonists. Defendant-garage ovners sold the gasoline to two of the conspirators in violation of statutory regulations, the gasoline
being sold in unsealed and unmarked containers, and the defendants failing to render
a report of the sale to the proper authorities. In addition, the purchasers did not
hold a permit for the transportation, storage, sale or use of the gasoline. Defendants
moved for a dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency at law, which motion was
denied. Upon appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department, held, unanimously affirmed. Section C19-153.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of
New York imposes liability for injuries sustained as a result of the violation of the
statute, so long as there is a "recognizably practical or reasonable connection be13. 411 I"1. 431, 104 N.E. 2d 267 (1952). The vendor of real property was unable
to convey title free from dower interest as agreed in the contract of sale. The purchaser
who had gone into possession following partial payment sued for a conveyance with
abatement The vendor counterclaimed for recission and possesion. Claims of both
parties were dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed. Vendor subsequently sued for
ejectment and the purchaser counterclaimed for specific performance which the court
allowed.
14. Ordinary application of the rules of res judicata would bar the claims of both
parties, leaving the controversy between them still unsettled after 10 years of litigation.
This case may be distinguished from the instant one where the court rever-ed its reasonlug on the merits.
15. See Hah v. Hugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135 (1901); Farrington v. Payne, 19
Johns. 432 (N.Y. 1818).
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tween the violation of the statute and the accident which occurred." Daggett v.
Keshner, - App. Div. -, 135 N.Y.S. 2d 524 (lst Dep't 1954).
Relying upon the fact that the statute expressly imposes civil liability' the
court in the instant decision deemed the pleadings to allege a cause of action
though they failed to show that the act of the defendants was the proximate cause
of the harm to the plaintiffs.
Within the general term "causation," it is necessary to draw the fundamental distinction between cause in fact and proximate or legal cause. 2 By cause in fact is
meant that there is an actual causal connection between the act or omission of one
person and the resulting effect on another. Before any question of proximate or
legal cause can arise, it must first appear that the defendant's act was the actual
cause or cause in fact of the plaintiff's harm. 3 Proximate cause is a delimitation
of cause in fact, i.e., the law, "because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough
sense of justice .... arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain
point. ' 4 In determining this point the courts have devised a number of tests, the
application of which establishes the limitation of the defendant's legal responsibility.5
Originally, the "but for" or causa sine qua non rule was used to determine legal
cause. 6 By this test, the defendant was liable to the plaintiff if the latter's harm
would not have happened but for the defendant's conduct. 7 Eventually, however,
the rule was employed to establish simply the fact of causation. 8 Today, it is not
regarded as being essentially the causa causans, or the legal or proximate cause.0
Having applied the "but for" rule to establish cause in fact, a court then must
advance to the further problem of the extent of the defendant's legal responsibility,
and this, in reality, is in no way a question of causation, for that has already
been established. 10 It is rather one of the fundamental policies of the law, as to
whether the defendant's responsibility should extend to such results."1 This is what
the courts have called proximate cause.
Pointing out that the plaintiffs' causes of action are not based on common law
negligence, the court in the instant case dispenses with proximate cause as the limi1. § C19-153.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (1937) provides
that a person suffering bodily injury from the explosion of a compound or mixture "the
sale of which . . . has not been . . . licensed as herein provided . . . may maintain an

action for damages against the person violating the provisions of this title."
2. Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103 (1911).
3. Harper on Torts 253 (1933).
4. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928).
5. Ibid.
6. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 233 (1908).
7. Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harvard L. Rev. 103 (1911).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Prosser on Torts 340 (1941). In Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45
N.E. 354 (1896) the Court of Appeals refused to impose liability though there was a clear
causal connection between the act of the defendant and the harm to the plaintiff, stating
that to allow recovery would be "contrary to principles of the public policy." See also
Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866) wherein liability was limited on
the grounds of policy despite the presence of a direct causal relationship.
11. Id. at 341.
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tation of defendants' liability, and holds them legally responsible if there is what
is termed a "recognizably practical connection" between the defendants' acts and
the plaintiffs' harm.'- The substitution of this norm as determining the extent of
liability apparently is a novel one and hitherto unencountered in the field of tort
liability. This "practical connection" then is to be the measuring rod, not proximate cause. The court does not explain the elements of this causal nexus, but
in determining whether the "connection" exists, curiously enough, employs the
"but for" rule, declaring that the injuries to the plaintiffs would not have occurred
but for the illegal sale of the gasoline.z3 In effect, it would appear that the court is
attempting to make cause in fact the "practical connection" and is finding liability
thereon. Although in such a case the court may properly do away with the doctrine
of proximate cause, nevertheless, it is submitted that in the present decision there
is no causal connection between the violation of the statute and the subsequent injuries since the application of the "but for" rule fails to establish even cause in
fact. The sole norm then for determining liability is the seemingly vague and
uncertain "practical connection" whereby the court would extend liability even in
the absence of any causal relationship.
The statute in the immediate case imposes no limitations on the number of separate sales of gasoline in quantities less than one gallon. It was entirely possible,
therefore, for the conspirators to have accumulated a sufficient amount by a series
of small legal purchases. It is also suggested that they could have easily accomplished their purpose by having the gasoline put directly into the tank of their
vehicle. In such a case the statute imposes no restrictions and it would be a simple
matter for the arsonists to have driven off, to have removed the gasoline from the
tank and return to have it refilled until the desired amount was obtained. In either
of these hypothetical cases the same result would have occurred and yet defendants
would not be liable. The explosion that ultimately resulted would have occurred
whether the defendants sold the gasoline to the conspirators in violation of the
statute or not. Obviously, then, we cannot say that if the defendants had not sold
the gasoline in the instant case, the plaintiffs would not have been injured. Thus,
the application of the "but for" rule does not establish even cause in fact, which
requisite must exist before the extent of liability can be determined. The cause in
fact in the present case as well as in the hypothetical cases proposed is the subsequent independent acts of the conspirators.
Admittedly, causes of action for statutory breach depend upon the intent of the
legislature in the particular statute' 4 and the language thus employed,1 5 nevertheless, it would still seem to be the general rule that the violation of the statute must
be shown to have been the proximate cause of the injury.'( This is also true in the
case of penal statutes. 17 The court in the present case interprets the intent of
12. Daggett v. Keshner, - App. Div. -, 135 N.Y.S. 2d 524 (Ist Dep't 1954).
13. Ibid.
14. Monteith v. Kokomo Wood Enameling Co., 159 Ind. 149, 64 N.E. 610 (1902).
15. Rosse v. St. Paul and D. Ry. Co., 68 Minn. 216, 71 N.W. 20 (1897).
16. Pollard v. Trivia Building Corp., 291 N.Y. 19, 50 N.E. 2d 287 (1943); Klinkenstein v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 246 N.Y. 327, 158 N.E. 886 (1927); Stern v. Great Island
Corp., 250 App. Div. 115, 293 N.Y. Supp. 608 (1st Dep't 1937); Smith v. Morton Motor
Co., 145 Neb. 396, 16 N.W. 2d 843 (1944) ; Ham v. Greensboro Ice & Fuel Co, 204 N.C.
614, 169 S.E. 180 (1933).

17.

Homin v. Cleveland & Whitehili Co., 281 N.Y. 484, 24 N.E. 2d 136 (1939); Steel
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the legislature as waiving this requirement, and stresses the fact that the provision
for civil liability has survived a number of formal amendments since the enactment of the statute in 18711 s and that the section is concerned with dangerous combustibles and explosives. Such is not the case in other jurisdictions where the courts
have still demanded a sufficient display of proximate cause in actions involving
violations of statutes with express impositions of civil liability.19 In Morrison v.
Lee,20 the plaintiff had sustained injuries as the result of an explosion of oil sold by
defendant in violation of a statute similar to that involved in the immediate case.
The North Dakota court sustained defendant's demurrer on the grounds that the
injury was caused by plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In the course of the
opinion it is stated that though such statutes are beneficial and should be strictly
enforced, it still does not follow from this that a person who violates the statute
is civilly liable under all circumstances. 2' The court there expressed doubt that the
legislature intended to impose absolute liability regardless whether
such violation
22
had, in fact, anything directly to do with causing the explosion.
Although it is within the province of the legislature to alter the common law requirements for liability in the field of negligence 23 it does not seem that the legislature
here intended to extend liability to injuries having no factual causal relation with the
violation of the statute. The essential inquiry in this situation is whether the statute
was designed to give protection against the particular type of hazard incurred.2 4 The
section in question is self-styled as a fire prevention code 25 and appears to have as
its intended circumference, the normal municipal regulation of combustibles and
explosives. It has the form and content of a fire regulation designed to prevent the
transportation and storage of inflammable liquids in quantities 'greater than one
gallon except by a person having a permit to do so. It would not appear to have
been enacted to protect against the risk of intervening criminal acts of third
partieg. To expand the scope of protection afforded by the statute to embrace injuries having no causal connection with the violation of the statute would seem
to be a forced construction of the purpose of the legislature. Such an interpretation would lead to unreasonable results and should therefore be presumed to be
against the legislative intent.
Car Forge Co. v. Chec, 184 Fed. 868 (7th Cir. 1911); Michael v. Key System Transit
Co., 98 Cal. App. 189, 276 Pac. 591 (1929).
18. Laws of 1871, c. 742; Laws of 1882, c. 410, § 452 et seq.; Laws of 1897, c. 378,
§ 760 et seq.; Laws of 1901, c. 466, § 760 et seq.; Laws of 1937, c. 929, § C19-1.0 et seq.
19. Pirtle's Administratrix v. Hargis Bank and Trust Co. et al., 241 Ky. 455, 44 S.W. 2d
541 (1931); Low v. Clear Creek Coal Co., 140 Ky. 754, 131 S.W. 1007 (1910); Mankey
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 14 S.D. 468, 85 N.W. 1013 (1901).
20.
21.

22 N.D. 251, 133
Ibid.

N.W.

22.

Ibid.

23.

Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N.Y. 531, 108 N.E. 830 (1915); Reid v. Terwillger, 116

548 (1911).

N.Y. 530, 22 N.E. 1091 (1889); Volans v. Owen, 74 N.Y. 526 (1878).
24. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause 40 (1927).
25. Administrative Code of the City of New York, Tit. C, Pt. I, Art. 1, § C19-1.o.
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TRusTE.s-Covr?

sisoNs ALLOWED THEM BY STATUTE.

-The terms of testator's will impose a duty upon his trustee to collect the rents
under a 99 year net ground lease which was one of the principal assets of the trust
fund. By the terms of the lease, the trustee was to collect the rent; re-let in case
of re-entry; pay taxes if the tenant defaults; take possession if the tenant becomes
bankrupt; exercise certain rights in demolition proceedings if tenant demolishes;
make repairs if the tenant does not do so, etc. The testamentary trustee, in addition to his regular two per cent commission, retained six per cent of the gross
rents collected on said premises granted to testamentary trustees who collect rents
and manage real property. Objectants' contention was that the trustee was not
required to "manage" the premises within the meaning of Section 285 (a) (7) of
the Surrogate's Court Act, therefore not entitling him to the extra commission.
Held, objections overruled and dismissed. A net ground lease imposes ultimate
responsibility for proper administration of the demised premises on the trustee,
so as to entitle him to retain commissions for services in managing the premises,
as well as for collecting rents. In re Smathers' Will, - Misc. -, 133 N.Y.S. 2d
15 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
The problem before the court was to determine whether or not the trustee came
within Section 285 (a) (7) of the Surrogate's Court Act., The court based its
2
decision on In re Brenan's Wil.M
In that case the Surrogate in the lower court
had first allowed commissions to a trustee for the collection of rents and management of real property. Then by his own order, the Surrogate vacated the
decree by disallowing it on the ground that the lease in question, at all times
available, was newly discovered evidence and that by its terms it relieved the
trustee from management. The issue presented to the Court of Appeals wus
whether the Surrogate could vacate his decree under Section 20 (6) of the Surrogate's Court Act 3 which confers power upon a Surrogate to modify a decree
for fraud, newly discovered evidence, clerical error or other sufficient cause. The
court held that the lease did not constitute newly discovered evidence, so that
the Surrogate did not have the power to modify or vacate his own judgment.
Therefore, this disposition of the appeal on procedural ground left nothing further to be determined, since the party opposing the original determination of the
Surrogate did not appeal.4 But after deciding this issue, the court went on to
say that by the terms of the lease the ultimate responsibility of management
rested with the trustee, which could not lawfully be evaded and the exercise
of which constitutes management within the meaning of the statute.5 The dis1. N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act § 285 (a) (7) (1948). "Where a trustee is for any
reason or cause whatsoever entitled or required to collect the rents of and manage real
property, the net amount of rents collected and not the gro s amount shall be used in
making computation of commissions allowed by subdivision two hereof, and in addition
to the commissions hereinbefore provided he shall be allowed and may retain for such
services six per centum of the gross rents collected ... "
2.

251 N.Y. 39, 166 N.E. 797 (1929).

3. Laws of 1914, ch. 443, N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act § 20 (6).
4. See Appeal Record, In Re Brennan's Will, 251 N.Y. 39, 166 N.E. 797 (1929).
5. Laws of 1923, ch. 649, N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act § 285 (6). The statute at that
time provided that where a trustee or executor is by the terms of the instrument required
to collect the rents and manage real property, he shall retain five per centum of the gross
rents collected in addition to his regular two per centum comm' son.
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cussion by the court, therefore, as to the interpretation of "management" was
obiter dicta since this issue was not before the Court of Appeals for determination on the merits. In Crane v. BennettG the Court of Appeals itself points out
that a judicial opinion, like evidence, is only binding so far as it is relevant, and
when it wanders from the point at issue it no longer has force as an official utterance. The court in the instant case felt constrained to apply the dicta of the
Brennan case to the facts before it, since as the court points out, the Brennan
case has been cited by the Surrogate's Court in past decisions. However, these
past cases can be distinguished on their facts.
In In re Beekler's Will,7 the testamentary trustees were required to pay real
estate taxes on oil properties and to collect oil royalties as they became due. The
trustees cited the Brennan case as an authority for the allowance of commissions for the management of real property but the court disallowed the commissions and held that the Brennan case did not apply because it did not involve
management commissions with respect to royalties received under oil leases. In
the case of In re Schmidt s the court allowed the extra commission to the executors for rent collection and management of real property. The court found that
the executors exercised the responsibilities of management by administering the
estate prior to a residuary trust, selling mortgaged realty of the estate, paying
persons interest out of the estate fund for sums of money which had been awarded
them paying to testator's daughters each month specified sums of money, from the estate fund, paying attorney's fees for legal services rendered to the estate and also by
paying taxes on the real property. In the case of In re Sidenberg's Estate,D the
trustee was required not only to collect the rents and manage a hotel business
but also to do the same for stores, rooms and suites, occupied under leases,
located in the same building with the hotel. Here too, the court cited the
Brennan case, but only to call attention to the liberal interpretation given the
term "manage." The court did not rely on it in its decision to allow commissions because it found actual management of the premises by the trustee.
The statutory right of commissions to trustees dates back to 1817.10 In those
early times it affected executors and administrators and similar representatives
but excluded testamentary trustees since authority over them rested primarily in
chancery."1 It was not until 186612 that testamentary trustees became entitled
to commissions in the Surrogate's Court' 3 and not until 19231 4 that a separate
statute was enacted allowing commissions to trustees who collected rents and
managed real property. At common law the trustee received no compensation
for his services whatsoever, the honor of the appointment alone being sufficient. 10
Therefore, statutory commissions to trustees being in derogation of the common
6. 177 N.Y. 106, 69 N.E. 274 (1904).
7. 204 Misc. 797, 127 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
8. 36 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
9. 147 Misc. 742, 264 N.Y. Supp. 704 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
10. McWhorter v. Benson, 1 Hopk. 28 (N.Y. 1823).
11. 6 Jessup-Redfield, Surrogate's Law and Practice § 5276 (rev'd ed. 1951).
12. Laws of 1866, ch. 115 expressly authorized the Surrogate's Court to grant commissions to testamentary trustees.
13. Matter of Roosevelt, 5 Redf. 601 (N.Y. 1882).
14. Laws of 1923, ch. 649, Surrogate's Court Act, § 285 (6).
15. In re Corning's Will, 160 Misc. 434, 289 N.Y. Supp. 1101 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
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law, should be strictly construed according to well settled rules of statutory construction. 16
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion
for construction' 7 and the statute must be given effect according to its obvious
meaning.' 8 The plain meaning of words has great weight in statutory interpretation.' 9 Ordinarily, the courts will not enlarge the meaning of statutory language particularly where the words have a definite and precise meaning.20
The term "manage" is fairly uncomplicated and unambiguous. It has been
defined to mean control, to carry on, to direct the concerns of a business or establishment and it is generally applied to affairs that are somewhat complicated and
L
that invoke skill and judgment 21
In construing the statute, the court in In re
Byrne's Will22 said: "Management imports activity. It includes the payment of
housekeeping charges, of mortgage interest, of taxes, of water rates and generally involves the same activities which an owner would carry on in respect to
his own property." The court goes on to point out that it should be clearly
noted that the extra commission covers not only the collection of rents but also
the management of real property.
4
3
The case of It re Knight,9 which was decided one year after the statute;
granting commissions to trustees was enacted, held that a fair construction of
the intent of the legislature was that the trustee must, in order to become entitled to extra compensation, actively superintend or control the real property. The
term "manage?' implies the supervision, maintenance and care of the premises,
the making of necessary repairs, the payment of taxes and water rents. The
court concluded that by the terms of the will the trustee was required to collect rents but it did not allow the trustee the extra commission on the grounds
that no one of the managerial duties, set forth by the court, was required to
be assumed by the trustee of the estate under the 21 year net lease covering
the property in question. The trustee's responsibility was limited to the collection of rents (as in the instant case) and the regular two per cent commission
furnished ample payment for these services.
The lease in the case under discussion was entered into by the decedent, not
the trustee. The terms of the lease, in effect, substitute the tenant for the
trustee as to all indicia and prerogatives of ownership. The only acts of the trustee
are purely ministerial and clerical (collection of four quarterly rent checks); none
are discretionary; none are managerial. The lease covers the land and buildings; the
tenant may demolish and reconstruct at his pleasure subject only to the rights of
16. Psota v. Long Island Railway Co., 246 N.Y. 38, 159 N.E. 180 (1927); Matter of
Chinsky's Estate, 159 Misc. 591, 288 N.Y. Supp. 666 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
17. Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y. 523, 99 N.E. 2d 679 (1951).
18. "...,
I fail to see how a court has a legal right to interpret language which leaves
no room for interpretation. To do otherwise is to bring down upon the courts the welldeserved condemnation of 'judicial legislation'." VanWalderveen v. Martin, 19S Mec. 91,
93, 91 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (City Ct. 1949).
19. Bowder v. United States, 312 US. 335 (1941).
20. Mitchell v. M.itchell, 194 Misc. 73, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
21. 3 Black's Law Dictionary (1933).
22. 159 Mdisc. 302, 309, 287 N.Y. Supp. 961, 971 (Suer. Ct. 1936).
23. 124 Misc. 430, 208 N.Y. Supp. 716 (Surr. Ct. 1924).
24. Laws of 1923, ch. 649, Surrogate's Court Act § 285 (6).
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the trustee regarding party walls, elevators, etc. Although the trustee has the duty
to make repairs if the tenant does not do so, there is no clause in the lease that
allows the trustee to enter the premises for inspection. Repairs, therefore, are left
to the discretion of the tenant. With the exception of the collection of rent, the
terms of the lease are contingent and remote. The premises virtually belong to the
tenant for the 99 2year
term. The position of the trustee throughout this term is
5
passive not active.
The decision in the instant case gives a broad and liberal interpretation to Section 285 (a) (7). In effect it gives to a trustee the right to collect an extra commission without the necessity of engaging in the active management of the real property. It is submitted that the legislature did not contemplate allowing trustees six
per cent of the gross rents collected for the mere receipt thereof.

ZONING-RIGHT OF A MUNICIPALITY AND THE RESIDENTS THEREIN TO QUESTION

THE VALIDITY OF A ZONING AMENDMENT ENACTED BY A NEIGHBORING MUNICIPALITY.
-By an amendment to its zoning code, the Borough of Dumont reclassified a residential block to permit business use. Three adjacent municipalities, property owners
therein, and property owners in Dumont brought suit in lieu of prerogative writ to
set aside the amendment upon the grounds that it resulted in "spot zoning." The
trial court held that the amendatory ordinance constituted "spot zoning," stating
also that all plaintiffs were proper parties. On certified appeal to the Supreme
Court, held, unanimously affirmed, declining, however, to rule as to the right of
the neighboring boroughs and owners therein to prosecute such a suit. Borough
of Cresskill et al. v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A. 2d 441 (1954).
The Supreme Court of the United States has passed judgment upon the validity
of zoning statutes and established their constitutionality.' Heretofore, the generally
ascribed approach to the use of property was the common law maxim that one was
entitled to the free and unfettered use of his property so long as he did not abuse
such right by interfering with his neighbor's correlative entitlement. The usual
relief was that of injunction where the abuse had resulted in a nuisance,2 or where
one owner had invaded his neighbor's riparian rights.3 However, some jurisdictions
had curtailed the unrestricted use of property by enacting zoning statutes, but grave
misgivings existed as to the constitutionality of this power.4 The argument advanced
by the appellee in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company5 was that the zon25. See 1A Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees 284 (1951) wherein the author
points out that a trust is passive where the trustee holds property and collects the Income
and pays it over to the cestui. The trust is active when, besides paying over the Income
to the cestui, the trustee must manage the property generally or perform specific acts of
management such as paying taxes, making repairs, lease, sell or mortgage the realty.
1. Village of Euclid et al. v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. Everett et ux. v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 Pac. 879 (1910); Prosser, Torts 589
(1941) ; Tobey, Nuisance, 11 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 402 (1933).
3. Williams v. Wadsworth, 51 Conn. 277 (1884); 1 Farnham, Waters and Water
Rights 401 et seq. (1904).
4. People ex rel. Friend v. City of Chicago et al., 261 Ill. 16, 103 N.E. 609 (1913);
State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N.W. 1017 (1916).
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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ing ordinance was in derogation of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it deprived
it of property without due process of law and denied it the equal protection
of the law. The ordinance was affirmed on the basis of the police power, the
court stating that the right to exclude buildings devoted to business from residential districts bears a rational relation to the health and safety of the community. Thereafter, the state legislatures hastened to take advantage of their
recently assured authority by enacting legislation enabling their political subdivisions to promulgate and administer zoning laws. In fact, every state has passed
some type of zoning legislation,6 and many states have incorporated into their con7
stitutions provisions for zoning.
Some zoning statutes have been declared unconstitutional because they exceeded
the bounds prescribed in the Euclid case.3 Many decisions are in apparent conflict.9 However, the basic differences and difficulties have been largely resolved so
that today, except for a few incidental questions such as invalidity in enactment or
where fraud exists, judicial relief is sought only where it is maintained that the
zoning ordinance is invalid because it constitutes "spot zoning." Fundamentally,
"spot zoning" exists where a particular parcel has been carved out of an area and
been granted a use inconsistent with the territory enveloping it. It was stated in
Marshall v. Salt Lake City et al, 10 that "... . the cases relative to 'spot zoning' are
generally cases where a particular small tract, within a large district was specially
zoned so as to impose upon it restrictions not imposed upon the surrounding lands,
or grant to it special privileges not granted generally, not done in pursuance of any
general or comprehensive plan." As with other branches of law, the courts are
loathe to substitute their judgment for the discretion of the legislative body, and
1
will only do so where such legislation is clearly arbitrary and abusive of discretion.
Thus, within the area of zoning, the concept of "spot zoning" has become practically synonymous with arbitrary and abusive action. And without exception, the
courts are outspoken in their abhorrence of "spot zoning" since, as recently stated
by the New York Court of Appeals, it is "the very antithesis of planned zoning.'"
This hostile attitude appears to justify the precedent stated and implied in the
principal case.
The significance of this decision is found in the parties seeking relief since this
is apparently the first instance where persons outside of a municipality have sought
to interfere with zoning enactments. Here, three adjoining municipalities, as well
as individual residents therein, joined with residents of Dumont in seeking to set
6. Housing and Home Finance Agency, Comparative Digest of Municipal and County
Zoning Statutes, chart (1952).
7. Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Louisiana, Missouri,
ibid.
8. Averne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938)
wherein the zoning at issue was so restrictive as to be declared a taking of property;
State ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in America v. Joseph et a]., 139
Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E. 2d 515 (1942) wherein a regulation was invalidated as an invasion
of property rights.
9. For a comparison of two conflicting decisions, see 30 Iowa L. Rev. 135 (1944).
10. 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 711 (1943).
11. Stengel v. Crandon et al., 156 Fla. 592, 23 So. 2d 835 (1945); Eggebeen v. Sonnenburg et al.,
239 Wis. 213, 1 N.W. 2d 84 (1941).
12. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
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aside its amendment, and it is safe to assume that heretofore local boundary lines
have acted as a deterrent to persons outside the municipality. In fact, two of
the leading texts' 3 on this subject, in their definitions of an "aggrieved person",
haN% declared that to be entitled to relief one should be an adversely affected property owner or resident "within the city." And, in allied questions relating to municipal law, the courts have held that residents of other communities do not have the
requisite interest to institute an action questioning the validity of ordinances passed
by adjoining municipalities.' 4
In the instant case, the Superior Court's opinion in passing upon the issue of
whether non-residents were proper parties expressly held that such persons were entitled to be heard. On this aspect, the Superior Court said (with respect to the
rights of the individual non-resident property owners), "These property owners have
a vested right to the benefits from the zoning restrictions against a business use,
subject only to a proper exercise of the police power."' 15 With respect to the neighboring municipalities, the same court said, "Certainly, a municipality has the power
to bring suit against any one for the purpose of protecting the public's interests
which the municipality itself is endeavoring to promote, and which it is in duty
bound to promote."' 6
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court declined to pass on the question, but
affirmed the trial court's decision upon the grounds that the residents of Dumont
clearly had a right to question the validity of the amendment, and were entitled to
have such amendment set aside. Nevertheless, there are clear indications in the
opinion that the responsibility of a municipality for zoning does not end with the
municipal boundaries, but must take into consideration the adjoining areas as well.
On this subject, the-opinion reads, "At the very least Dumont owes a duty to hear
any residents and taxpayers of adjoining municipalities who may be adversely
affected by proposed zoning changes and to give as much consideration to their
rights as they would to those of residents and taxpayers of Dumont."17 Previously,
the significant comment was made in answer to the argument that the responsibility of a municipality ends at its boundaries: "Such a view might prevail where
there are large undeveloped areas at the borders of two contiguous towns, but it
cannot be tolerated where, as here, the area is built up and one cannot tell when
one is passing from one borough to another."' 8
The opinion of the Superior Court has been criticized' 0 on the ground that "ex13. 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 596 (3d ed. 1950); Yokely, Zoning Law and
Practice 290-1 (1948), both citing a definition in Kamerman et al. v. Leroy et al., 133
Conn. 232, 50 A.2d 175 (1946).
14. State (Smalley, Prosecutor) v. Board of Education, 63 N.J.L. 201, 42 Atl. 748
(1899) wherein prosecutor's land extended into the municipality whose actions ho was
disputing. However, since his property was taxed entirely by another municipality In
which the rest of his land was located, the court declared that he was neither a resident
nor a taxpayer and therefore had no standing.
15. 28 N.J. Super. 26, 44, 100 A. 2d 182, 192 (1953).
16. Ibid.
17. 15 N.J. 238, 247, 104 A.2d 441, 445 (1954).
18. Ibid.
19. 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1071 (1954). But see 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 71 (1954) where the
dictum in the Supreme Court's decision is commended by inference in that legal action
should he used to resolve intergovernmental disputes.
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tensive repercussions" might result from the requirement that an amendment be
reasonable in its effect on property, not only in the municipality in which it was
enacted, but also in the territories contiguous to the municipality. This position
seems untenable, however, since only a relatively few neighboring residents or property owners could properly be classified as "aggrieved parties," and as such they
are entitled to relief.
It would appear that the implication to be drawn from the Supreme Court's comments indicates that a right is to be accorded to non-residents to question arbitrary
zoning regulations of an adjacent municipality. Such a result would appear to be
equitable since boundaries should not be, in the words of the Supreme Court,
"Chinese walls" which could foreclose a neighbor from the enjoyment of his
property.

